12.

A CORRECT COPY OF SOME NOTES

Concerning

Gods Decrees,

Especially

Of *REPROBATION.*

Written for the *private Vse* of a *Friend* in *Northampton-Shire.* And afterwards *published* to *prevent Calumny.*

1654.

By *T. PIERCE* Rector of *Brington.*

Ἐυλαβοῦ τὰς διαβολὰς κἂν ψευδεῖς ὦσιν. *Isocrat.*

OXFORD

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12

A

CORRECT COPY

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SOME NOTES

Concerning

Goas Decrees,

Especially

OF REPROBATION.

Written for the [illegible] of a [illegible] Nationalism, Sales, And [illegible] Calvin.

1751.

[illegible]

Reprinted by [illegible]

To a *Perſon* of *Honour* and *Integrity*, who was the *principal perſwader* to this *Publication*.

THough *I could not well anſwer your* former Reaſons *why I ſhould publiſh a* true Copy *to* anticipate *a* falſe *one, yet I was willing to be* obſtinate *in a caſe of* this nature; *wherein to* vindicate *my* credit, *did ſeem* (*to me*) *too great a* prejudice *to my* eaſe; *and was thought* (*by ſome friends*) *to be an* hazarding *of my* ſafety. *And as I have never been delightled to lye* basking *in the* Sun, *ſo of late* (*more eſpecially*) *I have been even ſo* Amorous *of living* retiredly *in the* ſhade, *that I would fain have provided for my* Peace *and* Quiet, *as more conſiderable to Me, than my* Reputation. *Not that I dare be ſo* wedded *to* eaſe, *or* ſafety, *as* guiltily *to* court *them by* ſloth, *or* cowardize; *nor that* I *dare be ſo* indifferent *to the* good opinion *of* good men, *as not to* deſire *to be very* well thought of; *but becauſe* I *had reſolv'd to* ſit *and* ſmile *upon my* ſufferings, *and to purchaſe* the continuance *of my* beloved obſcurity *and* repoſe, *by that which I thought a* lawful means; *even the* burying *my ſelf amongſt my* books, *and living under the* protection *of* paſſive ſilence. *But having put my* Judgement *into other mens* hands, *and more eſpecially into* yours, *and being perfectly* conquer'd *by your* this week's *letter, who was but* diſorder'd *by your* laſt, (*againſt which I muſt confeſſe I did rather* ſtand out, *by an affected* deafneſſe, *than any real diſſent,*) *and being now no longer threatned by* bare report, *but by* one *who profeſſeth* (*under* hand *and* Seal) *to have been writing againſt* papers *which he reſolvedly calls* mine,

(*adding, that he intends to make them* publick,) *I finde my self brought to such an unfortunate* Dilemma, (*either of having a* false copy *printed, or else of printing a* true copy *to discountenance the* false,) *that I must pitch upon this* last *as the* lesser evil. *And so your* wishes *and my* fears *are come upon me; whilst I lie under a* necessity *of going* abroad *into the* world, *meerly in order to my very* privacy *and* peace. *For the very same* Letter *which threatens the* publishing *of* papers falsly *bearing my* Name, *cal's me the* Grandchild *of* Pelagius, the Enemy of God, of Christ, *and* of his Church, *with more such* [illegible] *than I will ever repay in kinde. The greatest revenge that I will seek, shall be* (*in* love *to his* person) *to* conceal *his* Name. *I hope my* Soul *hath been* dieted with cleaner food, *than to* break out *at the* mouth *into such* exulterate Eryfipelas's. *And that I shall* get moderation *by those very* means, *by which I finde some men have* lost *it. And though I hope it doth not lie in the power of any, to* infect *my* Name *with such a* Leprosie, *as to make it* loathsome *to* those *persons by whom I desire to be* approv'd, *yet have I* hated *the* publication *of this my* scribling, *for fear some* young *or* old Trojan *should make it an* Apple *of* Altercation. *For you know this* Age *is full of* Salamanders, *who never live so pleasantly as in the* Fire *of* Contention: *in hopes to* expire, *and to be buried,* (*like some* Pausanians, *or* Herostratus,) *in the* Armes *of* Fame, *though not of* Glory. *And truly this is the reason, why I have* suffer'd *so* long *in so* deep *a* silence; *even* hating *the* means, *because* abhorring *the* effects, *of a* Vindication; *and desiring that what I* built *upon such* controverted subjects, *might be* (*like* Solomon's Temple) *without the least* noise *of* Axe *or* Hammer. *If I had* lookt *upon* my self

with

with so much reverence, *as to have made my self believe I could be* publickly useful, *I would have fasten'd upon a* subject *which should have been* fitter, *and more* easie, *more* profitable, *and* pleasant, *and every way more* acceptable *to* my self, *and* others. *I have been very attentive to that preaching of* Siracides, Search not the things that are above thy strength, but what is commanded thee think thereupon with reverence, *&c. And whilst I consider, that* God will render to every man (*not according to his* opinions, *but*) according to his works; *I do not think it so good a task, to make men* orthodox Christians, *as to make them* honest *and* sincere *ones. If I had been one of* those, *who prefer the* Truth *of* opinion *to the* Truth *of* practise, *and hate a man more for the* least Error *of his* Judgement, *than for the* greatest obliquity *of his* Will, *I might indeed have been* forward *on* such *a* Subject. *But because* I *have* seriously observ'd, *that whilst men* scamble *too* eagerly *after the* Truth *of* Religion, *they* (*in the* heat *of* Contention) *do* lose *the* practise, I *have passed the* hardest censure *upon my present* necessity, *and have been hitherto* (I *believe*) *the* unkindest man *in the* world *to mine* own Publication. *But you* (*Sir*) *are to* thank *me for my* misfortune, *in submission to whose* Judgement I *have offer'd* violence *to mine* own. *I may be a* stranger *to my* self *through the* deceitfulness *of my* Heart, *but if my* Heart *does* not deceive *me, no man living has gon to* Presse *with greater* vanity, *than I am now going thether with* self-denial. *I am sure tis my* averseness *to this* publication *which has now* extorted *from me an* unproportionable length, *both of my* Letter *to* your self, *and of my* Paræneſis *to the* Reader; *making a* Portal *somwhat too* large, *for the* littleness *of the* Cottage *to which it* lead's. *Which as*

Ecclesiasticus 3, 21, 22, 23.

Rom. 2. 6.

I first

I first submitted *to your* Judgement, *so must I now* commit *it to your* disposal, *and withal* commend *it to your* Protection. *I say to your* Protection, *because* (*whilst the* Presse *is so* prostituted, *And the* Age *so* prurient,) *it is not likely to be the* safer, *for being* innocent. *It was not the* modesty *of* Susanna, *that was able to* secure *her from the* Indictment *of the* Elders; *and 'twas the* innocence *of* Joseph, *which made his* Mistresse *pronounce him* guilty. *But had I imagined* (*as I did not*) *that my* private Notes *would have been so soon* vitiated, *and so unhappily* expos'd *too, when I deliver'd them as* whispers *into* one *man's* Ear, *I would infallibly have us'd them, as* Virginius *did his* vertuous Daughter; *that at least they might have gon* unpolluted out *of the* world. *But since they are severely* condemn'd *to* live, *in spight of all my endeavours to have* suppresst *them*, (Nam Pro supplicio est, non potuisse mori,) *and that* you will *have them shew'd by* me, *in their* natural shape, *rather than by any* stranger, *in any* uncharitable disguise; *I hope that* you *will secure me from* farther trouble, *by undertaking its* vindication *against whatsoever* pragmatick person, *who shall possibly abuse either* Them, *or* me. *For the* temptation *must be* greater, *and* the necessity *more* urgent, *than I hope it will ever be, if* I draw *at either* end *of the* Saw *of* strife. *But you have* leisure, *as well as* skill; *and you are able to* forget *your* rank *and* Quality, *in* favour *to* him *who does honour your* vertues *and* Erudition, *above your* Fortune *and your* Blood. *And who is not more by* obligation *of* Duty, *than by the peculiar inclinations of his Soul, Sir,*

Your affectionate, obliged
And humble Servant,

From my House
at *Brington*,
Jan. 20. 1654.

T. PIERCE.

A PARÆNESIS to the *Reader*.

(*Shewing the* first occasion *of this* following Discourse, *and the* Author's necessity to *make it* publick.)

SECT. 1.

THat I am subject to *errors*, it is no *humility* to acknowledge; it being no more than to confesse, that I carry about me the infirmities of a *man*; which whosoever doth not, let *him cast the first stone at me*. But whether or no I am an *Heretique*, or a *dangerous Person*, I desire my *Censors* may be my *Judges*; and do therefore addresse this present *Apologie* and *Appeal*, not to the *kindnesse* and *partiality* of my dearest *friends*, but to the very *jealousies* and *prejudices* of my severest *enemies*. I bar the suffrage of none, but the *accuser of the Brethren*, that *Abaddon* or *Apollyon*, so *very skilfull to destroy*, *who is the Father of Lies*, and was *a murderer from the beginning*.

Joh. 8. 7.

Rev. 12. 10. 9. 11. Joh. 8. 14. 44.

2. I do professe in the presence of that *punctuall Register* within me, (to which I bear a greater *reverence* than to *affront* it with a premeditated and *wilful Lie*,) that I do not *unsheath* my Pen, to *wound* the *reputation* of any man living. But since mine own does lie *bleeding* in the mouths of *some*, whose very *Tongues* have *Teeth too*, which *bite* much *harder* than I will ever allow *mine*, (and if there happen to be any in all my papers, I shall not think it *painful* to have them *drawn*,) it is but needful that I be cloth'd, at least with *armour* of *defence*. I meant indeed, at the first, only to have *armed* my self with *silence*, that my *reservednesse* and *obscurity* might keep me *safe*: and even now that I am *forc'd*, and as it were *drag'd* into the *field*, I contend not

not for *victory*, but for an *honourable Retreat*. So that if after I have ſuffer'd, I may be *competently ſafe*, I will thank my *Buckler*, but not my *Sword*. Even now that I am *writing*, 'tis with a kinde of *unwillingneſſe* to *blot* it *out*; and I do only *ſo* do it, as preferring an *Inconvenience*, before a *Miſchief*.

3. There had been a *private conference* betwixt a Gentleman and my ſelf, which (for his further ſatisfaction) I threw haſtily into paper; every whit as *incoherent*, as it had been in our *oral* and *extemporary* Diſcourſe. a Diſcourſe which of neceſſity was forc'd to be without *method*, as without *premeditation*; becauſe (in my *anſwers* to his *objections*) I was bound up to *follow*, after the meaſure that I was *led*. I thought the thing ſo *inconſiderable*, as not to vouchſafe it a *reading over*, but juſt as it was written, deliver'd it inſtantly to my friend, to be return'd (when he had us'd it) unto the *uſual place of my forgetfulneſſe*. And forgotten it was ſo long, that truly I know not how long it was; till diſcourſing with another Gentleman upon the very ſame ſubject, I found my memory awak'd by that *ſleeping ſcribble*; And (forgetting that *ſecrets* do ceaſe to be ſo, when they are *told* though but to *one*, and that with ſtrict conjurations of greateſt *ſecrecy*, gave him leave to peruſe it as his leiſure ſerv'd him. It ſeems this Gentleman had a *Confident*, as well as I; and ſo my *original* grew to multiplie into many falſe copies, of which *not one* was like the *Mother*. Now that my paper went abroad by the help of more *hands* than one, was againſt my *knowledge*, againſt my *will*, againſt my *precept*, againſt my *care*, and laſtly againſt my *beſt endeavours* to *recal them*. It having been abſolutely impoſſible, that I ſhould love the *publication* of my *contemptible* Abortive, who never eſteemed even my *ripeſt* and moſt *legitimate productions* to be any way worthy of *publique view*. So far was I from an *ambition* of being known by a *diſfigur'd*, *miſhapen child*, that when I heard of its *travels*, it was faln out of my *memory*; and when it came to me in a *diſguiſe*, it was quite out of my *knowledge*.

4. I do acknowledge the great *abſtruſneſſe* of the whole

ſubject

ſubject on which I treated, and the *diſproportion* of my faculties to undertake or manage it as it deſerves. For if the learned Biſhop *Andrewes* did chooſe with S. *Auſtin*, much more may I with Biſhop *Andrewes*, rather to *hear* then to *ſpeak* of theſe *Inſearchables*. I do not hope to fathom, either the *Bathos* of the *Apoſtle*, or the *Pſalmiſt's Abyſſe*. But I expect to be pardon'd, if when my way is ſlippery, I take heed to my *footing*; and if I ſo eſchew the *precipice*, as not to run upon the *Wolfe*. It is not the buſineſſe of theſe *papers*, either to ſtate an *old queſtion* in a *new found way*, or to publiſh my *judgment* as a *conſiderable thing*. *Who* am I, that I ſhould *moderate* between the *Remonſtrants* and *Antiremonſtrants*? betwixt S. *Auſtin* and *other Fathers*? betwixt *him* and *himſelf*? betwixt the *Synod* of *Dort*, and that other at *Auguſta*? betwixt the *Dominicans* and the *Jeſuites*? *Arminius* and Mr. *Perkins*? *Twiſſe* and *Bellarmine*? or betwixt *Whitaker* and *Baro*? Much indeed may be *excus'd*, becauſe much may be *look't* for, from ſuch reverend Prelates, as were *Overall*, and *Davenant*. But I beleeve, amongſt the *Clergy*, there is not *one* in an *hundred* fit to *ſpeak* of theſe *Myſteries*; and amongſt the *Laity*, not *one* in a *thouſand* that's fit to *hear* them. Hence was that *ſilence* at the firſt, and afterwards that *ſecrecie*, wherein I fain would have *buried* my private reaſonings. and even now that I am *forc'd* to be more publique then I *meant*, (by the many *falſe copies* of my *diſcourſe*, whereof *one* of the *falſeſt* is now preparing for the *preſſe*, by one who (it ſeems) is at very *great leiſure*,) it is not at all from any *ambition* to be *follow'd*, but from an humble *deſire* of being *rightly underſtood*; and I do therefore only pretend to an *Apologie*, and an *Appeal*. Firſt, an *Apologie*, for my *Imprudence*; that I could think ſuch a ſecret might be communicated to *one*; and ſo betray thoſe *papers* to the *Light*, which belonged only to the *Fire*. Secondly, an *Appeal*, whether I am a flat *Pelagian*, or whether ſo much as a *Maſſilian*: or whether indeed I am not rather a very *Orthodox* ſon of the *Church* of *England*. I have *managed* my *diſcourſe*, as I *ground* my *Faith*, not from that which is

Epiſc. Winton in Jud. de art.

Rom. 11 33.
Pſal. 36. 6.

bidd of God's *ſecret will*, but from that which is *expreſs't* of his *written Word*. Where, of *divers* interpretations, (as often as they are *divers*,) I love to pitch upon *That*, which I finde agreed upon by the beſt and *wiſeſt*. And which, in my *ſhall-w judgement*, (which yet is the *deepeſt* that I *have*,) doth ſeem the *ſafeſt*, and the moſt *ſutable* to the *Analogie of Faith*. Even *Babes* and *Idiots* have this advantage of their *betters*, to be *afaid* of that *fire* where *wiſer* men have been *burnt*. And *ſad experience* hath *taught me*, (who am a *Babe* and an *Idiot* in reſpect of the *aged* and the *wiſe*,) to *ſteer aloof* in my Doctrines from thoſe fatal *ſhelves* whereon mine own *ſmall veſſel* hath oft been *daſhed*, and many others (much *greater*) as it were *ſhipwrackt* before mine *eyes*. This intirely is the reaſon, why I have *hover'd* a long time betwixt the *Abſoluteneſſe* of a *Decree*, and the *Liberty* of a *Will*; like a *trembling Needle* betwixt *two Load-ſtones*; or rather like a man *newly walking* upon a *Rope*, who ſo *ballanceth* his body with his two *hands*, that his *continual fear* of *falling* is the principal *Tenure* by which he *ſtands*. I dare not, for my life, be ſo *bold* as the *Pelagians*, nor yet ſo bloudy as the *Manichees*. I would not be *ſplit* on the *Symplegades* of *two* intolerable *miſchiefs*, by robbing God of his *Efficiency* in any *one Act* which is *naturally* good; or by *aſperſing* his *Holineſſe* in any *one Act* which is *morally evill*. I do endeavour to keep my ſelf, (and others committed to my *keeping*,) both from the *rock* of *Preſumption*, and from the *gulf* of *Deſpair*. I *ſteer* as carefully as I can (in this ſo dangerous *Archipelago*) betwixt the *nature* of *God will*, and the *condition* of mine *own*; that ſo my *Confidence* may conſiſt with the great Requiſite of *Humility*. I dare not *impute* to *God* what is *unworthy* for him to *own*; nor *arrogate* to my *ſelf* what is *God's peculiar*: and therefore ſettle my *minde* and *judgement* upon theſe *two Grounds*.

The two Principles *or* Grounds *of my* Belief *in this* buſineſſe.

I. That all the *Evil of ſin* which *dwelleth in me*, or *cometh from me*, is not imputable unto *God's will*, but entirely to *mine own*. The *Serpent* and the *Protoplaſt* were *promoters* of my guilt, but *my God* was no promoter either

either of *their* guilt or *mine*. *When the Serpent ſpeaketh a lie, he ſpeaketh of his own; He is the Father of lies, and the works of your father ye will do*, Joh. 8. 44.

II. That *all the good* which I *do*, I do firſt *receive*; not from *any* thing in my *ſelf*, but from the *ſpecial Grace* and *favour* of Almighty God, who *freely* worketh in me, both to *will* and to *do* of his *good pleaſure*. Phil. 2. 13.

CHAP. I.

5. IF theſe are *Principles* to be *granted*, my work is don; for theſe are the *Grounds* on which I *build* my Theologie, and theſe are the *Touchſtones* by which I *try* it. Whatſoever I beleeve concerning *Election* or *Reprobation*, and whatſoever other *Queſtions* which are depending, I do infer from theſe *Truths*, which cannot poſſibly *deceive* me. And whilſt I ſtand to theſe *Grounds*, I am not able to *quit* my *judgement*, how little ſoever it ſhall be *favour'd* by ſuch as are *wittily unreaſonable*. So that my *Principles* be *right*, I care not *whither* they *conduct me*, whilſt *Scripture* and my *beſt Care* are both my *Guides* in the *conveyance*; for where the *Premiſes* are *true*, the *Concluſion* cannot be *falſe*. All that needs to be car'd for in the *progreſſe* of my *ſearch*, is the *legality* of the *deduction*; which, if it be *wrong*, I ſhall be very glad to hear of for my *inſtruction*; and if it be *right*, it cannot chooſe but be *Truth*, which leaps ſo *naturally* forth from the *womb of truth*.

Sic proponam, ſic aſſeram, ut veritati, quæ nec fallit, nec fallitur, ſemper inhæream, ſemper obediens conſentiensq; reperiar. Fulgent. ad Monim. l. 1. ſub init.

6. If by any inadvertency (either in *me*, or in the *reader*,)

Nec ineſt iis quæ de libero arbitrio Patres quidem & Neoterici aſſeruerunt, ea quam olim non nulli putant impietas, ſi hæc rite modò accipiantur, & ſicut ipſi ſcriptores ea accipi voluerunt.

der,) my *words* ſeem to *claſh* with my *Belief*, it is by no other misfortune then befell the Great *S. Auſtin*, when he us'd ſuch expreſſions againſt the *Pelagians*, as ſeem'd at leaſt to contradict what he had ſpoken againſt the *Manichees*; and yet (as he profeſſeth) it was not his *judgement*, but his *ſtyle* only that was chang'd. The ſaying of *Bucer* is remarkable, (and the more for being *Bucer's*,) That *there was not any ſuch harm in what was ſaid by the learned, both ancient and modern, concerning the freedom of the Will, if things were taken as they were meant*, (that is to ſay) by the *right handle*. And that would oftner be don, if the *perſons* of ſome men were not a *prejudice* to their *cauſe*. For I finde the *ſame words* may paſſe with *favour* from *one*, which would not be *endur'd*, ſhould they be ſpoken by *another*. One *ſhort example* will not be *burdenſom* to the *Reader*. Doctor *Twiſſe* himſelf hath ſaid, *That the juſtice of God doth not appear in the abſolute or ſimple condemnation of his creature, but in the condemnation of it for ſin.* Thus he ſpeaketh in his *Preface*, which is moſt of it ſpent againſt *Arminius*. I did but ſay the *ſame words* to ſome *admirers* of Dr. *Twiſſe*, and yet was counted an *Arminian*; which makes me heartily deſire, that I may meet with *unbyas't impartial Readers*; that whatſoever I ſhall ſay in theſe following papers, may be *compar'd* with the two *Principles* I have even now *laid*: I diſallowing *all*, that *diſagrees* with thoſe *principles*, as the *unhappineſſe* of my *pen*, or the *unſteedineſſe* of my *brain*. I deſire all may *go* for *no more* then it is *worth*. If I ſeem to any man *overtaken in a fault*, he ſhall do well to *reſtore me in the ſpirit of meekneſſe, remembring himſelf leſt he alſo be tempted*. If I am thought to be in the *wrong*, by thoſe that think themſelves only in the *right*, they can conclude no worſe of me, then that *I am not infallible*.

Apud Caſſand. conſul. p. 130.

In præfat. ad Vind. Grat. p. 3.

Gal. 6. 1.

fallible. If in any thing I *erre*, it is for *want* of *apprehension*, and not of *willingness* to *apprehend*; nor am I *severely* to be censur'd, for being every whit as *dull*, as those *thousands of thousands* who have thought as I do. I hope my *Reasons* will make it clear, that if I erre, I am not *affectedly*, but *invincibly* ignorant; and so for being most *unpassionately*, I am most *pardonably erroneous*. Or if I am thought not to be so, I desire one favour from them that so think, even that all my faults (whether *real*, or *suppos'd*,) may rather be laid upon my *person*, then imputed to my *Cause*.

7. Before I come to prove any thing from the *first* of my *Principles*, I foresee a *necessity* to *prove* my *Principles* to be *true*; for *though the foolishnesse of man perverteth his way, yet his heart fretteth against the Lord*. Prov. 19. 3. There are men in the world of no *small name*, who have told the world both out of the *Pulpit*, and from the *Presse*, that *all the evill of sin* which is *in man* proceedeth from *God* only as the *Author*, and from *Man* only as the *Instrument*; whether or no I am deceiv'd, let the *Reader* judge by the following *Catalogue* of *Expressions*. I forbear to name the *Authors*, in meer *civility* to their *persons*: but I have them lying by me very particularly *quoted*, and will produce them, if I am challenged by any man's *Doubt*, or *Curiosity*. The Expressions are such as these: (to begin with the mildest.)

"That *all things* happen, not only by God's *Præsci-* L. 3. c. 23. §. 6. p. 324.
"*ence*, but by his expresse *order* and positive *Decree*.
"Whereby many from the *womb* are *devoted* to certain
"and *inevitable Destruction*, that by their misery God's
"Name may be glorified.

"That God directeth his *voice* to some, but that they L. 3. c. 24. §. 13 p. 223.
"may

" may be so much the *deafer*; he gives *light* unto them,
" but that they may be so much the *blinder*; he offers
" them *instruction*, but that they may be the more *igno-*
" *rant*; and he useth a *remedy*, but to the end they may
" *not* be *healed*.

L. 1. *c.* 18. §. 4. *p.* 71.

" That a wicked man, by the *just impulse* of *God* doth
" that which *is not lawful for him to do*.

L. 1. *c.* 17. §. 11. *p.* 66.

" That the Devil and wicked men are so *restrained*
" on every side with the *hand* of *God*, as with a *bridle*,
" that they cannot *conceive*, nor *execute* any *mischief*, nor
" so much as *endeavour* its execution, any farther then
" God himself doth (not *permit* only, but) *command*:
" nor are they only held in *fetters*, but *compelled* also as
" with a *bridle*, to perform obedience to such commands.

L. 1. *c.* 17. §. 5. *p.* 64.

" That *Theeves* and *Murderers* are the *instruments* of
" the *Divine Providence*, which the Lord himself useth
" to execute his Judgements which he hath determined
" within himself, and that *he works through them*.

L. 1. *part.* 1. *Digr.* 10. *c.* 1. §. 4. *p.* 125.

" That *Gods Decree*, by which any man is destined to
" condemnation for sin, is not an *Act of his Justice*, nor
" doth it *presuppose sin*. Or if *Damnation* doth *presuppose*
" *sin*, it doth not follow, that the *Præscience of sin* doth
" precede the *Will* or *Decree* of *Damning*; or if the
" Will of Damning any man is an *act of vindicative Ju-*
" *stice*, it doth not follow that it *præsupposeth sin*.

Ibid. §. 12. *p.* 140.

" That God can will that man shall *not fall*, by his *will*
" which is called *Voluntas signi*, and in the mean while
" he

" he can ordain that the ſame man ſhall *infallibly* and *ef-*
" *ficaciouſly fall*, by his *Will*, which is called *Voluntas bene*
" *placiti*. The former *will* of God is improperly called
" his *will*, for it only ſignifieth what man *ought* to do by
" *right*; but the latter *will* is properly called a *Will*, be-
" cauſe by that he decreed what ſhould [inevitably]
" come to paſſe.

" That when God *makes* an *Angel* or a *Man* a *Tranſ-*
" *greſſor*, he himſelf doth not tranſgreſſe, becauſe he
" doth not break a law. The *very ſame ſin*, viz. *Adultery*
" or *Murder*, in as much as it is the work of *God* the
" *Author*, *mover*, and *compeller*, it is *not a crime*; but in
" as much as it is of *man*, it is a *wickedneſſe*.

In ſerm. de Prov. c. 5. & c. 6. & ſic citatur l. 2. part. 1. p. 36.

" That they are cowards and ſeek for *ſubterfuges*, who
" ſay that this is done by God's *Permiſſion* only, and not
" by his *Will*. If the *excæcation and madneſſe* of *Ahab*
" is a Judgement of God, the *fiction* of *bare permiſſion*
" doth preſently *vaniſh*; becauſe it is ridiculous, that
" the Judge ſhould *only permit*, and not alſo *decree* what
" he will have done, and alſo command the execution
" of it to his Miniſters.

L. 1. c. 18. §. 1. p. 88.

" That God's decree is not leſſe *efficacious* in the per-
" miſſion of *Evill*, then in the production of *Good*. (Nay)
" that God's will doth paſſe, not only into the *Permiſſion*
" of the ſin, but into the *ſin itſelf* which is *permitted*.
" (Nay) that the *Dominicans* do *imperfectly* and *ob-*
" *ſcurely* relate the Truth, whileſt beſides Gods concur-
" rence to the making way for ſin, they require nothing
" but the *negation of efficacious Grace*, when it is mani-

L. 2. part. 1. p. 142, 143, 147, 148, &c.

 feſt,

" fest, that there is a *farther prostitution to sins required.* " (Nay afterwards) that God doth *administer* the occa- " sions of sinning, and doth so *move* and *urge* them, that " they *smite the sinners minde*, and *really affect his Imagi-* " *nation*, according to all those degrees, whether of *Pro-* " *fit* or *Pleasure*, represented in them.

If my *hand* were not *weary*, if my *heart* did not *tremble*, if both my *ears* did not *tingle*, I could reckon up many more such *frightfull sayings*, from mine own *knowledge* and *inspection*, which I have quoted to the *page*, and can do to the *line* of their several *Authors*: besides a *cloud* of blasphemies which I could name from other *compilers*, if I either *lifted* or had *need* to take up any upon *Trust*. Now by all this it appears, (as well as by many *too literal expositions* of some Texts in Scripture, which make God (blessed for ever!) to be the *Tempter*, the *Deceiver*, and *the Father of Lies*,) there is a *necessity* lying upon me to *prove* my *first Principle*, before *some Readers* will dare to *trust* it, *viz.*

The first Principle.

That all the Evill of sin which dwelleth *in me*, is not imputable to *God's* Will, but entirely to mine *own*. *Adam* and the *Serpent* may be allowed as *sharers*, but my *God* (blessed for ever!) is none at all.

Proved by Scripture.

8. This is plain by *Scripture*, & by the Evidences of *Reason*: (to which anon I shall add *Antiquity*.) And first for *Scripture*, though the force of a *Negative Argument* is not *irrefragable*, yet it is not unworthy to be observ'd, that God is no where affirm'd to *Predestine sin*: and therefore the word *Predestination* is us'd without any *Epither*, to signifie

Praedestinare Deum homines ad peccata, aut poenas, in S. Scripturis non dicitur, sed eos ad vitam aternam praedestinare dicitur, quos vocare decernit. Grot. in Riv. Ap. Disc. p. 52.

ſignifie nothing but *Election* in the ordinary ſenſe: & it is ſet by *Divines* (both ancient and modern) as an oppoſite member to *Reprobation*; which cannot be done from the *bare nature* of the *word*, but from the *Vſe* of it in *Scripture*: and why ſhould that be the *ſole uſe* of it (when the word it ſelf is as *fit* to ſignifie the *contrary*) but becauſe God is the Author of all the *good* that we *do*, and of all the good that we *receive*, whereas Man is his own Author of *all* the *Evil* which he *committeth*, and of the *Evil* which he *ſuffereth* for ſuch *commiſſions*?

Quatuor priores Articuli Lambethani ſunt de Prædeſtinatione, *&* Reprobatione, *quarum illa ſignificatur* Rom. 11. 33. *hæc* Pſal. 36. 6. Epiſc. Wint. de Artic. Judic.

9. And though this bare *negative Proof* might ſeem ſufficient in ſuch a caſe, [that *God doth no where profeſſe he wil's or decrees the ſin of Man*] yet (to make us *inexcuſable* when we excuſe our ſelves, like *Adam*, by any the leaſt accuſation of him that made us) God doth every where profeſſe, that *he wil's not*: as when he (a) *forbids* it by his *Lawes*, when he *provides* againſt it by his (b) *Diſcipline*, when he (c) *ſhews* us how to *avoid* it, when he *tels* us he cannot (d) *endure* it, when he (e) *wins* us from it by *Promiſes*, when he *frights* us from it by (f) *Threats*, when he profeſſeth that it is to him both a (g) *Trouble*, and a *Diſhonour*. How doth he (h) *wiſh* that his *People had walked in his wayes*? How doth he (i) *expoſtulate* and make his *Appeal*, whether he had *omitted any thing*, which might tend to the *converſion* of a *ſinful Iſrael*? in the whole (k) 18. chapter of *Ezekiel*, God is pleaſed to make his own *Apologie* and *Appeal*, even to them that had accus'd him in an *unworthy Proverb*: [The Fathers have eaten ſowre Grapes, and the childrens Teeth are ſet on edge] *Are not my waies æqual*?

a Exod. 20. 1. Rom. 6. 12.
b 1 Tim. 1. 20.
c Deut. 11. 18. 26.
d Pſ. 5. 4. 5. & 45. 7.
e Iſ. 61. 8. Deut. 5. 29.
f Ro. 1. 18. Gen. 2. 17.
g Iſ. 7. 13.
h Pſal. 81. 13.
i Iſa. 5. 3. 4.
k Verſ. 2, 29.

and *are not your waies unæqual?* Sure *their* waies had been *his*, if he had *absolutely contriv'd them.* *The soul that sinneth it shall die*, vers. 4. *And why will ye die O house of Israel?* vers. 31. Which was virtually to aske them, *why they would sin too*; which they *ought* to have done, if he had *will'd* it: for the positive *will* of God *must* and *ought* to be *done*; and *can* any man be *punisht* for doing that which he *must*? *Must* any man be *punisht* for doing that which he *ought*? 'Tis but an ill κρυσφύγετον (which some men use) to say that God hath a *double Will*, of which the one is *secret*, and the other *revealed*; the revealed will not only *diverse*, but even *opposite* to the *secret* one: God *ordaining* sin with the *one*, whilest he *forbids* it with the *other*; and not alwaies *willing in secret* what he *reveals* himself to *be willing to*, for this is a *Salvo* (*a* σοφὸν φάρμακον) a great deal worse then the *wound* which it fain would *cure*. Gods *will* indeed is divided amongst *orthodox Divines* in respect of *severall Acts*, and in *relation* to *several objects*, or to the very same object at *several Times*, and in *several Qualifications*, into his *first will*, and his *second will*, his *antecedent* and *consequent*, his *secret* and *revealed* will: but to affirm *two wils* in *simplicity it self*, the one *contrariant* to the other about the very *same Act*, (the one *decreeing* that *very act* which is *prohibited* by the other) seemeth a greater blasphemy to *me*, then that which the *Gnosticks*, and the *Marcionites*, and the *Manichees* were guilty of, when they affirmed *two Gods*, as the different Fountains of *Good* and *Evil*. For by what I finde in *Tertullian* (who was best acquainted with *Marcion*'s Heresies) those *two Principles* of *Good* and *Evil* were found out as a *Refuge* for those *other opinions*, against which it is, that this my *Scribble*

Θέλημα πρῶτον, τὸ μὴ ἀπολέσθαι ἡμαρτηκότας. Θέλημα δεύτερον, τὸ γονομένους κακοὺς ἀπολέσθαι. *Chrysost. in c. 1. ad Eph. Homil. 1. p. 1036.*

Augustin. Hæres. 6. Tertull. adversus Mar. l. 1. c. 1. Duos Deos adfert tanquam duas Symplegadas naufragii sui.

Scribble was first design'd. And what *Tertullian* speaks against *Marcion*, might very well be repeated against the *Absolute Reprobatarians*: it having been better and more reasonable (in that *Father's Judgement*) that God should *never* have *forbid* what he *determin'd* should be *done*, then that he should *determine* to be *done* what he *forbid*. And so 'tis the *lesser blasphemy* of the two, to ascribe *Holinesse* to one principle, and *Unholinesse* to another, (in the *Marcionite's* sense,) then *both* to him who is the *Spirit of Holinesse*; who therefore cannot so *irrespectively* decree the *punishment* of his *Creature*, as to *necessitate* his *sin*, and so be the *Author* of his *Impenitence*.

Quis iste Deus tam bonus, ut ab illo malus fiat? ibid. c. 23.

Ibid. c. 26.

10. *Let no man say then when he is tempted, I am tempted of God* (as our modern *Ranters* are wont to do) *for every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed.* So far is God from being the Author of any man's sin, that *he is faithfull* (saith the Apostle) *and will not suffer us to be tempted above what we are able*, but *will be* sure to *make a way* either for *conquest*, or for *escape*. I dare not say then (with *him* in the *Comedian*, who had been a *great sinner*,) *Quid si hæc quispiam voluit Deus? What if some God hath so decree'd it?* for S. *James* makes me beleeve, that sin is both *ingendred* and *conceived* within me: when my *lust* hath *conceived*, it *bringeth forth sin*: and if my *Lust* is the *Mother*, sure the *Father* is my *Will*. It was *David's* saying of wicked *Israel*, *that they provok'd God to anger* (not with *his will*, but) *with their own Inventions*: there are *Contrivers of mischief*, (Ps. 58. 2.) *Devisers of lies*, (Eccles. 7. 13.) such *as weary themselves to commit iniquity* (Jer. 9. 5.) Which cannot possibly be imputed unto an *absolute decree*. How many *Volumes* have been written

Jam. 1. 13. 14. 15.

1 Cor. 10. 13.

Terent. in Eunuch.

Jam. 1. 15.

Ps. 106. 29.

Vide Cornel. Agrip. de vanit. scient.

De arte Magica? De arte Meretricia? De arte Lenonum? with such others as would *blush* to be nam'd in *English*; & dare we say they are *decreed*, to be *Mysteriously wicked*? or that their *destruction* was *irrespective* & *unconditionall*? I am in such *disorder* and *discomposednesse* of mind, whilst I only *repeat* these *bold expressions*, that were it not to *good* purpose (as I conjecture and intend) I *durst* not *venture* to *repeat* them. *O Lord, righteousnesse belongeth unto thee,* Dan. 9. 7. *but unto us confusion of face.* For *thou hast made man* Eccles. 7. 29. *upright, but we have found out many inventions.*

Proved secondly by Reasons.

11. After *Scripture* I come to *Reason*; by which I hope to make it appear, that God Almighty is so far from being *Accessary* to sin, and does so many things to *hinder* it, that he doth not *permit* it but in an *equitable sense*: and amongst many reasons which may be given, I shall (in *civility* to my *reader*, and for the *love* of *brevity*,) content my self with *that one*, which to my seeming is the *best*; and I the rather think it the *best*, because I ground it upon a notion which I have formerly learnt from *most judicious Mr. Hooker*: That which *assigns* to every thing the *kind*, that which *moderates* the *power*, and *appoints* the *form* and *measure* of working, That we properly call a *Law*. Hence the *being* of God is a kind of *Law* to his *working*; because that *perfection* which God *is*, giveth *perfection* to that he *doth*. So that *being* nothing but what is *good*, he can *work* nothing that is *otherwise*. It is therefore an *errour* (saith that *Man of judgement*) to think there is no *Reason* for the works of God, besides his *absolute will*, (although no reason is known to *us*,) for the Apostle tels us, *he worketh all things* (not *simply* and *meerly* according to his *will*, but) κατὰ τὴν βουλὴν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ, *according to the Counsel of his will*: and be-

Hooker Eccl. Polit. l. 1.

Eph. 1. 11.

cause

cause he doth *voluntarily* set himself a *Law* whereby to work, it followes that that *Law* is no abatement to his *freedom*. If he is pleas'd to set himself a *Law* or *Rule*, not to reprobate any but upon *præscience* of *sin*, (because that is most conformable to the *nature* of his *goodnesse*,) can this be any præjudice to the *perfection* of his *being*? Is his *nature* the lesse *absolute*, because it pleases him that his *will* be *conditionall* in *some* things, as it is *absolute* in *others*? Does he *lose* any *prærogative*, by being *unable* to be the *Author of sin*? Or is not that rather a very great *Argument* of his *Power*? such an *ability* as That being meer *Infirmity*. *We* are *God's* Creatures, but *sin* is ours. *God saw every thing that he had made and behold it was very good.* We see the things that are made by the *Fiat* of our *will*, and behold they are very *evil*. This *Creative power* of *ours* we justly reckon as the sequel of *Humane weaknesse*, and shall we heedlesly affirm it to be a *Jewel* in the glorious *diadem* of *God's Almightinesse*? The Apostle indeed hath told us, *that God worketh all things*, (Eph. 1. 11.) but first he speaks it of God's *Election* which he *prædestin'd* in his *Son*, and the means conducing to such *an end*, which are none but *good*; not at all of *Reprobation*, the *means* in order to which are none but *evill*. Secondly, even * *Beza* himself doth so interpret that place, as not to *annihilate*, or *stupefie*, but rather to strengthen, and to *rectifie* our *wils*. God makes an *ill will* a *good one*, not *no will* at all; (as * *Beza* elsewhere speaks, and it were heartily to be wisht that he had never spoken otherwise) according to that of *Austin*, *Ex nolentibus facit volentes*. He saies *facit*, not *adigit*, *cogit*, *compellit*. He *makes* us willing *who were unwilling*, but does not *force* us to be willing *whilst we are* unwilling;

Gen. 1. 31.

* *Nec tamen idcirco sumus stipites; ea enim nobis ut velimus & possimus concedit.* Beza. in Eph. 1. 11.

* *Bene volumus, non quidem naturâ, sed quia Deus ex malâ voluntate bonam fecit.* Ad Philip. 2. 13.

ling; (that is to say, to be *willing against* our *wils*, or *whether we will or no.*)

12. But I finde that I have *shot* somewhat farther then I *aim'd*; it being only my design, and the proper businesse of this place, to shew, that the words of the Apostle, [*he worketh all things*] are infinitely far from being meant either of *sin*, or *Reprobation*. So far from that, that God Almighty does not *permit* sin, as *permission* signifies *connivence* or *consent*; but he *permits* it, as that signifies [*not hinder by main force.*] If I see a man stealing and say nothing to him, I so *permit* as to be *guilty*: but if I *warn* and *exhort*, if I *promise* and *threaten*, and do all that may avert him (besides *killing* him) I so *permit* as to be *innocent*. In like manner, all that is done by God Almighty by way of *permission*, is his suffering us to *live*, and have that *nature* of the *will* with which he *made* us. Whereas *to destroy us* for the prevention of sin, or to make us become *stocks* (as *Beza* phrases it) or like *wooden Engines*, (which are moved only by *wires* at the *meer pleasure* and discretion of the *Engineer*) were by inevitable consequence to * *uncreate* his *Creature*, which to do were repugnant to his immutability, as *Tertul.* shewes. This is all that I am able to *apprehend*, or *pronounce*, [that God *permits* our *sins* in *this sense only*; and that he *disposes* and *orders* them to the *best advantage.*]

13. Having proved my *first Principle* by *Scripture* and *Reason*, it will be as easie to confirm it by the *common suffrage* of *Antiquity*; and to avoid the Repetition of so long a Catalogue, which I suppose will be as *needlesse*, as I am sure it will be *nauseous* to a *considerable Reader*, I refer him to the Citations which will follow

* *Liberum & sui arbitrii & suæ potestatis invenio hominem à Deo institutum; nullam magis Imaginem & similitudinem Dei in illo animadvertens, quàm ejusmodi status formam.* Tertull. adverſ. Marc. l. 2. c. 5. see also cap. 6. 7.

Proved by Antiquity c. 2. §. 18.

follow my *first inference Sect.* 18. And content my self at present to shut up all with that *Article* of the *Augustan Confession*; (to which our 39 *Articles* have the greatest *regard* and *conformity*, and which for that very reason is to me the most venerable of any *Protestant Confession* except *our own*,) That *though God is the Creator and Preserver of Nature, yet the only cause of sin is the will of the wicked (that is to say, of the Devil, & ungodly men,) turning it self from God to other things against the (will and) commandments of God.* And the *Orange Synod* doth pronounce an *Anathema* upon all that think otherwise.

Tametsi Deus creat & conservat Naturam, tamen causa peccati est voluntas malorum viz. Diaboli & impiorum hominum quæ avertit se à Deo ad alias res, contra mandata Dei. August. Confess. Artic. 16.

Aliquos ad malum divinâ potestate præordinatos esse, non solùm non credimus, sed etiam si sint qui tantum malum credere velint, cum omni detestatione in illis Anathema dicimus. Synod. Arausic. Can. 25.

If any will not subscribe to this *Confession*, I will leave him to learn *modesty* both from *Arrian* the *Heathen*, and from *Philo* the *Jew*.

Εκσέσεισαι ὑπ' ἄλλου μὲν οὐδενὸς, ὑπὸ σ' αὐτοῦ δέ. *Arrian. in Epictet.* Εἱμαρμένην τε καὶ ἀνάγκην θεοπλαστήσαντες, ἀσεβείας πολλῆς κατέπλησαν τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. *Philo* περὶ ἀποικίας τοῦ Αβραάμ. p. 325.

CHAP. II.

MY first *Demand* being *granted*, (as in the *Mathematicks* 'tis usual to *build* upon certain *Postulata*,) it does immediately follow, that [*man himself is the sole efficient cause of his eternal punishment*] (I say the *sole Cause*, as excluding *God*, but not the *Devil*; whom yet I also exclude from the *efficiency of the Cause*; because he only can *incite*, and *propose ill objects*, and

The first Inference. Ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ὅτι τοῦ τῶν αὐτοὺς ὁ Διάβολος αἴτιος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πονηροὺς γεγονέναι, ὅπερ ἐκ τρόπων γίνεται.

add *perſwaſions* unto ſin, but cannot *force* or cauſe it in me, without my *will*, and *conſent*: ſo that the Devil being only a *Temp'er*, and *Perſwader*, cannot (for That) be juſtly ſtyled an *efficient*. Or if he were, ſure for that very Reaſon God himſelf cannot be ſo: but only *Man* and the *Devil* muſt be the *Concauſes* of man's *Deſtruction*;) The ſecond thing I am to prove both by *Scripture*, and *Reaſon*, and the *ſuffrage* of *Antiquity*.

Ammonius in Job. 8. *Our ſelves we condemn as the only cauſes of our own miſery.* Hook. l. 5. §. 72.

15. And here I ſhall not be ſo ſolicitous as to riffle my *Contordance*, but make uſe of ſuch Scriptures as lye uppermoſt in my *memory*, and ſo are readieſt to *meet* my pen. Theſe I find are of two ſorts, *negative* on *God's* part, and *affirmative* on *man's*. God gives the firſt under his *oath*. (Ezek. 33. 11.) *As I live, ſaith the Lord, I have no pleaſure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live: turn ye, turn ye from your wicked waies, for why will ye die, O houſe of Iſrael?* In the 18. *chapter* of the ſame *Propheſie*, the *Latine* tranſlation is more *emphatical* then the *Engliſh*: for there it is not [*non cupio*] but [*nolo mortem morientis*] not that he does not *will* the death of a ſinner, but *that he wils it not*; he does not only *not deſire it*, but (which makes the proof ſtronger) *deſire's the contrary*, even *that he ſhould turn from his wickedneſſe and live*: (*cap.* 33. *v.* 14. *not willing* (ſaith S. *Peter*) *that Any ſhould periſh, but* (on the contrary) *that All ſhould come to Repentance.* And ſo (1 Tim. 2. 4.) *he will have all men to be ſaved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth.* Where it appears by the Context, that the Apoſtle does not only ſpeak of *all kindes* of *particulars*, but of *all particulars* of the *kindes* too: For he firſt of all exhorts them, that *prayers, and ſupplications, and giving of thanks be made for all*

Proved by Scripture. *In the negative.* C. 18. v. 32. 2 Pet. 3. 9.

all men, (verſ. 1.) Secondly, he does *inſtance* in one *ſort* of men, *for Kings and all that are in Authority*, (ver 2.) Thirdly, he addes the *Cauſe* of his exhortation, *for this is good and acceptable in the ſight of God our Saviour; who will have All men to be ſaved*, (verſ. 3. 4.) And if the *Spaniſh frier* ſaid true, *that few Kings go to hell*, (giving this Reaſon) *becauſe all Kings are but few*, the *Apoſtles* way of arguing will be ſo much the *ſtronger*; for when he ſpeaks of *all men* ingenerall, he makes his inſtance in *Kings*, in *all Kings too without exception*, thereby intimating *Nero* the *worſt of Kings*, under whom at that time the *Apoſtle liv'd*. And he uſes another argument (verſ. 6.) becauſe Chriſt *gave himſelf a Ranſome for All*. This is yet more plain from *Rom.* 2. 4, 5. *Deſpiſeſt thou the riches of his goodneſſe, and forbearance and long-ſuffering, not knowing that the goodneſſe of God leadeth thee to repentance? but after thy hardneſſe and impenitent heart treaſureſt up unto thy ſelf wrath againſt the day of wrath?* Obſerve who they are whom God would have to *repent*; even the *hard hearted*, and the *impenitent*. But I have proofs out of Scripture, *leſſe liable* to *Cavil* then any of theſe, which yet I thought fit to uſe, becauſe I finde they are the *Chief* of thoſe that *Voſſius* relies upon, and expounds to my purpoſe from the *Authority* of the *Ancients*. Nor will I add to theſe Texts above three or four more, of which the one will ſo *eſtabliſh* and *explain* the other, as to leave no place of evaſion to the gainſayer. Firſt our bleſſed Saviour is call'd by the Apoſtle, *the Saviour of all men, eſpecially of them that beleeve*, (1 *Tim.* 4. 10.) as if the Apoſtle had *foreſeen* an objection, that the word [*all*] might be reſtrain'd unto the *houſhold of Faith*, he prevents it by a diſtinction of *general*, and *ſpecial*: for

Rom. 2. 5.

Veteris hac Eccleſia ſententia fuit, velle Deum converſionem ad ſalutem omnium, non tantùm genera ſingulorum, ſed ſingulos generum intelligens. Gerard. Voſſ. in Pelag. Hiſt. *l.* 7. Theſ. 2.

1 Tim. 4.10.

if he is a *ſpecial Saviour of beleevers*, he is a *general Saviour* of *unbeleevers*; not that Theſe can be ſav'd, whilſt they are *obſtinate unbeleevers*, but only upon *Condition* they will *repent and beleeve*. Elſe why ſhould the Apoſtle affirm the *Saviour* to be of *All*, and then come off with an [*eſpecially*] to them that *beleeve*? Certainly if 'tis *every man's duty* to *beleeve in* Chriſt, Chriſt *then dyed for every man*. And this very argument is not eaſily anſwer'd in the very confeſſion of D. * *Twiſſe*; who yet does by and by ſay, 'tis eaſily anſwered, and yet he leaves it without an anſwer; only *ſcornes* it, & let's it *paſſe*.

* *Twiſſ. in Reſponſ. ad Armin. præfat. p. 16. col. 2.*

This is ſecondly confirm'd from the Apoſtle's way of arguing (2 *Cor.* 5. 14.) *If one died for all, then were all dead.* This is the *major Propoſition* of an *hypothetical ſyllogiſme*; in which the thing to *be proved* is, *that all were dead*; and the *Medium* to *prove* it is, *that one died for all.* Now every man knows (who underſtands how to reaſon) that the *argument of proof* muſt be rather *more*, then *leſſe* known, then the thing *in queſtion* to be proved: ſo that if it be *clear*, that *all men were dead* by the fall of the *firſt Adam*, it muſt be *clearer* (as S. *Paul* argues) that *life was offer'd unto all*, by the death of the *ſecond Adam*; and if none were *died for* but the *Elect*, then the *Elect* only were *dead*: for the word [*all*] muſt ſignifie as *amply* in the *Aſſumption*, as it does in the *Sequel*; or elſe the *Reaſoning* will be *fallacious* and *imperfect*. The Apoſtle thus argues,

2 Cor. 5.14.

If one died for all, then were all dead;
But one died for all; (*that muſt be the Aſſumption*)
Therefore all were dead.

Whoſoever here denies the *Minor*, does (before he is aware) condemn the *Sequel* of the *Major*; and ſo gives

gives the *Lie* to the very words of the *Text*; which I can look for from none, unleſſe from ſome impure Hereticks, who would conclude the greateſt *falſhoods* from the word of *Truth*. This is thirdly confirmed from the ſaying of the Apoſtle, (*Rom.* 11. 32.) *that God concluded all in unbelief* (the *Gentiles* firſt, verſ. 30. and afterwards the *Jewes*, verſ. 31.) *that he might have mercy upon all*; from whence I inferr, that if this laſt [*all*] belong to *none* but the *Elect*, then none but the *Elect* were concluded in *unbelief*. But 'tis plain that *all* without *exception* were (firſt or laſt) concluded in *unbelief*, therefore the *mercy* was meant to *all* without *exception*. Laſtly, it is confirm'd from thoſe *falſe Prophets and falſe Teachers*, (2 *Pet.* 2. 1.) who though *privily bringing in damnable hereſies, even denying the Lord that bought them, and bringing upon themſelves ſwift deſtruction*, yet it ſeems they were ſuch whom *the Lord had bought*. So far is God from being the *Cauſe* of mans *deſtruction*, by an *abſolute, irreſpective, unconditional Decree*, that he gave himſelf a *ranſom* for them *that periſh*. They were not left out of the *bargain* which was made with his *Juſtice*, for the Apoſtle tels us plainly they were actually *bought*. He whoſe *bloud* was *ſufficient* for *Ten thouſands worlds*, would not grudge its *extent* to the *major part* of but *one*: he was *merciful* to *all men*, but the *greateſt part* of men are *unmerciful* to *themſelves*. He is the *Saviour of all*, but yet all are *not ſaved*; even becauſe he only *offers*, does not *obtrude* himſelf upon us. He * *offers* himſelf to *all*, but *moſt refuſe* to *receive* him. He will have *no man* to periſh, but repent, by his *Antecedent will*; but by his *Conſequent will* he will have every man to periſh who is *impenitent*. Which is ſufficient to have been ſaid for the *negative part*

Rom 11.31.

2 Pet. 2.1.

* *Gratiam ſalutarem non exiſtimo conferri omnibus, ſed tamen omnibus offerri; & præſto eſſe Deum ut conferatur.* Epiſc. Wint. de Artic. Lamb.

of my undertaking, [*That the cauſe of Damnation is not on God's part*] in which, if any one Text be found of power to *Convince*, let no man cavil at thoſe others which ſeem to them *leſſe* Convincing. If any one has an objection, let him ſtay for an anſwer till his objection has been urged. It might ſeem too eaſie, to *ſolve objections* of mine *own choice*, or *confute* an *argument* of mine *own making*; and therefore I paſſe (without notice of common ſhifts, and ſubterfuges, till I am call'd to that *Drudgery*,) to the *ſecond part* of my enterpriſe, which is the *affirmative*.

Omnibus offertur Dei miſericordia. Nemo illius expers eſt, niſi qui renuit. Bernard. ſerm. 1. in purif. Mar.

In the Affirmative.

16. [*That man himſelf is the cauſe of his eternall puniſhment.*] Which though ſuppoſed in the *negative*, muſt yet be prov'd to ſome perſons, who are prevail'd upon by *faſhions*, and *modes* of ſpeech; and will *deny* that very thing when they ſee it in *one colour*, which they will preſently *aſſent* to, when they behold it in *another*. He who is very loth to ſay, that *God is the Author of ſin and damnation*, will many times ſay it in *other terms*; and therefore, in *other terms*, it muſt be proved that *he is not*. *O Iſrael thou haſt deſtroyed thy ſelf, but in me is thine help*, (*Hoſea* 13. 6.) They that privily bring in Damnable Hereſies *ſhall bring upon themſelves ſwift deſtruction*. *The fooliſhneſſe of man perverteth his way*: and as when *luſt conceiveth it bringeth forth ſin, ſo ſin when it is finiſhed, bringeth forth death*, (*Jam.* 1. 15.) If death is that *monſter*, of which ſin is the *Dam*, that *brings it forth*, how *foul* a thing muſt be the *Sire*? and can there be any greater *blaſphemy*, then to bring God's *Providence* into the *pedegree* of *Death*? *Death* (ſaith the Apoſtle) *is the wages of ſin*, (*Rom.* 6. 23.) And *wages* is not an *abſolute*, but a *relative* word. It is but rea-

Hoſ. 13. 6. 2 Pet. 2. 1. Prov. 19. 3.

Jam. 1. 15.

Rom. 6. 23.

ſon

son he should be *paid* it, who hath dearly *earn'd* it by his *work*. It is the sturdy *will* of man that is *the servant of sin*. *Disobedience* is the *work*, *Death* eternal is the *wages*, and the *Devil* is the *pay-master*; who as he *sets* men to *work* to the *dishonour* of their *Creator*, so he *paies* them their wages to the advancement of his *glory*. From whence I Conclude, (with the *Book* of *Wisdome*,) *God made not death, neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living: for he created all things that they might have their being, and the generations of the world were healthful, and there is no poyson of Destruction in them, nor the kingdome of death upon the earth. But ungodly men with their words and works call'd it to them, and made a Covenant with it*; because they are worthy to take [μερίδα] part with it. Verſ. 20. Wiſd. 1. 13. 14, 15, 16,

17. I will confirm this truth by no more then one Reason; which, if it is not the *best*, doth seem to me to be the *fittest*; as being aptest to evince both the *connexion*, and *necessity*, of my *first inference*, from my *first Principle*. It is taken from the *nature* and *use* of *Punishment*; which as soon as it is nam'd, does *suppose* a *Guilt*; for as every *sin* is the * *transgression of some Law*, so every *punishment* is a *revenge* on some *sin*. From whence it followes, that if a mans *sin is from himself*, 'tis *from himself* that *he is punisht*. And as the *Law* is not the *Cause*, but the * *Occasion* only of sin; so God is not the *Cause*, but the *Inflicter* only of *punishment*: for so saies the Apostle, *Sin taking occasion by the Commandment wrought in me all manner of Concupiscence: for without the Law sin was dead. That which is good not being made death, but sin working death by that which is good.* God and his *Law*, are, each of them, the *Causa-sine-qua-non*, the *Condition without which*, sin and punishment could not have been, (for *without* *Proved secondly by Reason.* * Ἀτομία. * Rom. 7. 8. Verſ. 13.

without Law, *no sin*, and *without God*, *no Reprobation*,) but not the *Energetical efficient Cause*, of which sin and punishment were the *necessary effects*. For if God had made *an Hell* by an *absolute purpose*, because *he would* that some should *suffer* it, and not in a *prævious intuition* of their sins; *Damnation* had been a *Misery*, but not a *Punishment*: as if a *Potter* makes a *vessel* on purpose that he may *break it*, (which yet none but a mad man will ever do,) or if a man meerly for *recreation* cuts up *Animals alive*, (which yet none ever did that I can hear of, except a *young Spanish Prince*,) it is indeed an *infelicity*, and a *Torment*, but no more properly a *punishment*, then it is *any thing else*. Indeed the *Common people*, who do not understand the *just propriety of words*, make no distinction many times betwixt *Pain*, and *Punishment*; not considering that *Punishment* is a *Relative word*, of which the *correlative* is *Breach of Law*; and therefore is fitly exprest in Scripture by the mutual relation betwixt a *Parent*, *and a Child*. When lust hath *conceived* it *bringeth forth* sin; sin being perfected *bringeth forth death*, * (*Jam.* 1. 15.) which is as much as to say, (according to the *propriety* of the *Apostles own words*) *sin is the parent*, *and death is the child*. Now there cannot be a *Child without* a *parent*; (they being *relata secundum esse*;) much lesse can the child be *before* the parent; (for *sunt simul natura*, *& dicuntur ad convertentiam*.) Whereupon it must follow, that *punishment* could not be *ordained* by God, either *without* sin, or *before it*, or *without any respect*, *or any intuition* of it, (which yet the great * Mr. *Calvin* does plainly say.) I say it *could not*, because it implies a *contradiction*. For though God could very easily make *Adam* out of the *earth*, and the *earth*

* Jam. 1. 15. Συλλαβοῦσα. Τίκτει Ἀποκυεῖ. Τὴν λητὰ ἀποκυῆσαι. *Apud Lucianum dr.*

* *Ideo præsciverit, quia decreto suo sic ordinavit.* & for no other reason, *Nisi quia Deo ita visum est.* Calvin. Instit. l. 3. c. 23. 6. 7. p. 325. *Non percipit se dicere, ea quæ vera sunt, eo ipso quòd vera sunt, falsa sint.* August. contra Faustum.

earth out of *nothing*, yet he could not make a *sinful Cain* to be the *son of sinful Adam*, *before* there was an *Adam*, much lesse before there was a *sinful one* : because it were to *be*, and *not to be* at the same time ; *Adam* would be a *Cause*, before an *Entity* ; which God Almighty *cannot* effect, even because he is *Almighty*. So that when the *Romanists* assert their *Transubstantiation*, or *the posterity of Marcion* their *Absolute decree* of *all* the *evil* in the *world*, (both pretending a *Reverence* to God's *Omnipotence*,) they do as good as say this, *That the things which are true may therefore be false, because they are true* ; or that God is *so Almighty*, *as to be able not to be God* : the best Result of an *Ability*, to *verifie two parts of a contradiction*. (So said *Austin* against *Faustus*, and *Origen* against *Celsus*.) Whensoever it is said, [*God can do all things*] 'tis meant of *all things that become him*. So *Isidore* the *Pelusiote*. But (to return to that argument in the pursuit of which I have stept somewhat too forwards) if Gods *præordination* of mans *eternal misery* were in order of nature *before* his *præscience* of mans *sin*, as Mr. *Calvin* evidently affirms in his [Ideo * *præsciverit*, quia *decreto suo præordinavit*,] setting *Præordination* as the *Cause*, or *Reason*, or *prævious Requisite* to his *Præscience*,) either mans *Reprobation* must come to passe *without sin*, or else he must sin to bring it *orderly to passe* ; which is to make God the author either of *misery by it self* without relation unto sin, or else of *sin* in *order* to *misery*. The first cannot be, because God hath * sworn, he *hath no pleasure in the death of a sinner*, (*Ezek*.33.44.) much lesse in *His death who never sin'd*. And because, if it were *so*, the Scriptures would not use the word *Wages*, and the word *Punishment*, and the word *Retribution*,

Οὐ δύναται αἰσχρὰ ὁ Θεὸς, ἐπεὶ ἔσται ὁ Θεὸς δυνάμενος μὴ τῷ Θεός. *Origen. contra Celsum l. 4.*

Isidorus Pelusiota quærenti, εἰ Θεῷ πάντα δυνατὰ, *respondit*, πάντα πρέποντα αὐτῷ.

* *Loco superiùs paulò citato.*

* *Idcirco jurat, ut si non credimus promittenti Deo, credamus saltem pro salute juranti.* Hieron. Epist. 46.

O beatos nos, quorum causa Deus jurat! O miserrimos si nec juranti credimus. Tertul. l. de Pœnit. c. 4.

tion, and the word *Reward*. *Hell* indeed had been a *Torment*, but not a *Recompence*; a *fatal Misery*, but not a *Mulct*; an *Act of power*, but not of *vengance*; which yet in many places is the *style* that *God speaks in*, *Vengeance* is mine, and I will *repay*, *Rom.* 12. 19. Nor can the *second* be lesse impossible, it having formerly been prov'd, that God is not the Author of sin; * *he hath no need of the sinful man*, whereby to bring mans *Ruin* the more *conveniently about*; and most of them that dare say it, are fain to say it in a *Disguise*. Some indeed are for [*ligonem ligonem*,] but the more *modest blasphemers* are glad to dresse it in *cleaner phrase*. A strange πρωθύστερον in Divinity, to put the 1 *childe before the parent*, the 2 *wages before the work*, the 3 *end before the means*, *the Reprobation before the sin*! yet so they do who make the *Decree* of *Reprobation* most *irrespective* and *unconditional*; and after that, say, that *whom God determines to the end*, *he determines to the means*. To *put the horse upon the Bridle*, is a more *rational Hypallage*: for by this kind of Theologie, eternal punishment is imputed to Gods *Antecedent will* (which is called the *first*) and *sin* to his *consequent will*, (which is the *second*.) The first προηγουμένως, and the other only ἑπομένως, punishment *chiefly*, and sin by way of *Consecution*. Men are bid not to sin *ex voluntate signi*, or *revelata*; but are determin'd to it *ex voluntate occulta*, or *beneplaciti*. *Distinctions* very *good*, when at first they were invented for *better uses*. The former by *S. Chrysostome*, from whom it was *borrow'd* by *Damascene*, and from him by the *Schoolmen*. But I say they all were us'd to very contrary purposes, by *them*, and by *these*, who endeavour'd to *repel* those Fathers with their own *weapons*, (as the elaborate *Gerard Vossius* does very largely

* Eccles. 15. 12.

1 Jam. 1. 15.
2 Rom. 6. 23.
3 Rom. 6. 21.

Poterit Deus velle voluntate signi & approbante, ut homo non labatur; interea voluntate beneplaciti statuere potest gratiam efficacem negare, ex quo infallibiliter & efficaciter sequetur ut labatur. Twiss. in vind. Grat. l. 1. de præd. §. 12. p. 140. *Voss. Pelag. Hist. lib. 6. Thes.* 2.

largely make appear.) I am sorry I must say, (what yet *I must* (saith * *Tertullian*) when it *may tend to edification*) That the *Lord God merciful*, and *gracious*, *long-suffering*, *abundant in goodnesse and truth*, who is *all Bowels*, and no gall, who *hateth nothing that he hath made*, who in the *midst of Judgement remembreth mercy*, *forgiving iniquity*, *transgression*, *and sin*, is exhibited to the world by the *Authors* and *Abettors* of *unconditional Reprobation*, as a *kinde of Platonick Lover of* so *excellent* a *Creature's everlasting misery*. Which if Mr. *Calvin* himself *confessed* to be an * *Horrible Decree*, (who yet *beleev'd* it,) how *frightful* must that opinion appear to *me*, who did therefore not believe it, because it *frighted* me *into my wits*? For to say that God is ἀνθρωποκτόνος, *a slayer of men* from *all eternity*, (who is *the Lamb slain*, that is, *a Saviour*, *from the Foundation of the world*, (Rev. 13.8.) is to affirm *that* of *him*, which he affirmed of the *Devil*, who is called by our *Saviour*, *A Murderer from the beginning*, Joh. 8. 44. Which the Devil could not be, if God had *absolutely willed* the *Death* of any, without *respect* or *relation* to the *snares* of the *Devil*; it being impossible to *murder the Dead*; or to *slay* those that were *kill'd* long *before* they were *born*. I know by whom it is answer'd, [That God doth *will sin*, not as it is sin, but as it is a *Medium* for the setting forth of his *Glory*; and so *Damnation*.] But whilst men *finde* out *Distinctions* to *excuse* God Almighty, they do imply him to have *offended*. A thing which I am now so very *weary* even to *think on*, that I hasten, for some *refreshment*, to my *third proof* of this *Inference*, to wit from the *suffrage* of *Antiquity*.

18. Before I name any particular, I will take the confidence to say in general, That all the *Greek* and *Latine*

* *Quod dicere periculosum, ad ædificationem proferendum est.* Tertul. de pœn. cap. 5.

* *Decretum horribile quidem fateor, inficiari tamen nemo poterit.* Calvin. Instit. l. 3. c. 23. §. 7.

L. 1. *part.* 1. §. 13. *p.* 140.

Proved thirdly by Antiquity.

Fathers before S. Austin, and even *Austin* himself before his contention against *Pelagius*, (and even during that contention in some *places* of his *works*) besides those *many Fathers* who lived *after him*, were *unanimously* of this Judgement, *That God did not absolutely decree the Reprobation of any Creature, but upon præscience and supposition of wilful rebellion and impenitence.* I have not liv'd long enough to read them all, but I have *dipt* into the *most*: and by the help of such *Collectors* as I have gotten into my *Study*, (whereof *Vossius* hath good reason to be the Chief upon *this occasion*: and I the rather use *him*, because I find him so very punctual in every one of the quotations, which I have had the *opportunity* to make *trial of*) I say, by the *help* of such *credible Compilers*, I shall give in a *cloud of witnesses* (I hope) sufficiently *Authentick*. I love as little to be *Voluminous*, as *Callimachus* would have me, (*cui* μέγα βιβλίον μέγα κακὸν) and therefore shall set down only the *Substance* of what the Fathers have said, referring the *Reader*, by my *Citations*, *to the larger fields* of their *Discourses*.

Ignatius in ep. ad Magnes. p. 53. edit. Usser. Justin. Martyr. in Apolog. prima pro Christianis pap. 35. edit. Sylburg. 1597.

Ἐὰν ἀσεβῇ τις, ἄνθρωπος τοῦ Διαβόλου οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γνώμης γινόμενος.

Ὅτι αὐτοξούσιον τότε τῶν Ἀγγέλων γένος καὶ τῶν Ἀνθρώπων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς, δικαίως ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν πλημμελήσωσι, τὴν τιμωρίαν ἐν αἰωνίῳ πυρὶ κομίσονται.

Tertull. contra Marcion. l. 1. c. 24. edit. Jun. A. D. 1597.

Pluribus pereuntibus, quomodo defenditur perfecta bonitas? *ex majore parte cessatrix, paucis aliqua, pluribus nulla cedens perditioni*, partiaria exitii? *Quod si plures salvi non erunt, erit jam non bonitas, sed malitia perfectior. --- magis autem non faciens salvos, dum paucos facit*, perfectior erit in non juvando. *---suæ potestatis invenio hominem à Deo constitutum, ---lapsumque hominis non Deo, sed libero ejus Arbitrio deputandum.* (I wonder *Vossius* did not take

Lib. 2. c. 5. 6.

take in *Tertullian*, then whom there is not any one more directly for this purpose. *Justin Martyr* also was ill omitted; and so was *S. Ignatius*.)

Ὁ γὰρ Θεὸς ἐκ θέλων ἐμὲ γενέσθαι βέλεται. οἱ δὲ ἐμοὶ γενέσθαι ὑφῆρεσάσαντο. —— ὧν ἡ κόλασις πολλή. Τὸν κύριον ἀπαρχύνεσθε, ἐλεύθεριαν ἐπαγγέλλεται, ὑμεῖς δὲ εἰς δουλείαν κατεδέξασθε.

Ἀεὶ τῷ Θεῷ βελομένῳ διατρίβειν τὸ γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ παντὸς τοῦ ἁμαρτιῶν.

Clemens Alex. ὁ προτρεπ. p. 24. edit. Commel. vide *& Clem. Rom. l. 1. Διαταγῶν, cap. 45. Theophil. ad Autol. l. 3. p. 336. edit. Basil. 1555. Origen. tract. 34. in Matth. p. 194.*

Ignem autem æternum non illis, *quibus dicitur* [*discedite à me maledicti*] *paratum* ostendit, *sicut regnum justis, sed* Diabolo, *& Angelis ejus: quia quantum ad se, homines non ad perditionem creavit, sed ad vitam æternam & gaudium.* (Note that *Chrysostome*, *Theophylact*, and *Euthymius*, interpret those words of *Christ*, as *Origen* doth.)

Athanas. orat. de incarn. verbi Dei. T. 1. p. 45. Macarius Homil. 26. p. 230. Homil. 30 p. 53. Basil. Homil. in Psal. 29. p. 80. Ambros. 2. de secundâ interpellat. David. c. 11.

Τί δὲ ἐκ ὁ Θεὸς ἐκολόν τότε, ἀφ' ὧν ἐκ ἐθέλησε γενέσθαι; Ὁ γὰρ Θεὸς, ἵνα δείξῃ τὰ ἑαυτῦ πλάγχνα, πάντας δέχεται, πᾶσιν φεσάρεσιν. Et alibi, αὐτὸς πολὺ πλαγχνίζεται ἐφ' ἡμᾶς, μακροθυμεῖ, πότε θεραπεύσωμεν ἑαυτὸν. Τιμωρία, κῦ τὸ δίκαιον κεῖμα τῦ Θεῦ. ζωὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ θελήματι αὐτῦ Τί ἔν φησιν; ὅτι ὁ μὴ θέλει ὁ Θεὸς τῦτό δῦ, πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῦ τ ζωῆς.

Ideo venit Dominus Jesus ut salvum faceret quod perierat. Venit ergo ut peccatum mundi tolleret, ut vulnera nostra curaret, Sed quia non omnes medicinam expetunt, sed plerique Refugiunt, ---ideo volentes curat, non adstringit invitos.

Hilarius Diacon. in epist. Pauli in Rom. c. 3. & 9. Idem ad 1 Tim. 11.

Non injuste judicat, quia omnes vult salvos fieri, manente justitia. ---Deus utique vult omnes salvos fieri. Cur non impletur ejus voluntas? Sed in omni locutione, sensus est, conditio latet. *Vult* omnes *salvos fieri, si accedant ad eum: non enim sic vult, ut nolentes salventur, sed vult illos salvari, si & ipsi velint: nam legem omnibus dedit, nullum excepit à salute.*

* *Chrysost. in 1 Tim. c. 2. p. 1556. Idem ad Ephes. c. 1. Hom. 1. p. 1036.*

* Μιμῶ τοῦ Θεοῦ, εἰ πάντας θέλει σωθῆναι, εἰκότως ἀπὸ ἁπάντων δεῖ εὔχεσθαι. Ἐι πάντας αὐτὸς ἠθέλησε σωθῆναι, θέλε καὶ σύ Ἐι δὲ θέλεις, εὔχου. — πανταχοῦ μὲν οὐδοκία, τὸ θέλημά ἐστι τὸ προηγούμενον· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἄλλο θέλημα· οἷον θέλημα πρῶτον, τὸ μὴ ἀπολέσθαι ἡμαρτηκότας· θέλημα δεύτερον, τὸ γενομένους κακοὺς ἀπολέσθαι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοὺς κολάζει, ἀλλὰ θέλημα. — εὐδοκία οὖν τὸ πρῶτον θέλημα. Τὸ σφοδρὸν θέλημα, τὸ μετ' ἐπιθυμίας θέλημα. — τίνος ἕνεκεν οὕτω φιλεῖ; ἀπὸ μόνης ἀγαθότητος. Ἡ γὰρ χάρις ἀγαθότης ἐστί.

Hieronymus advers. Pelagianos l. 2. sub finem & ad Eph. c. 1.

Miseratur humano generi Deus, & non vult perire quod fecit. Vult Deus quæcunque sunt plena rationis & consilii. Vult salvari omnes & in agnitionem veritatis venire. Sed quia nullus absque propria voluntate servatur, (liberi enim arbitrii sumus) vult nos bonum velle, ut cum voluerimus, velit in nobis & ipse suum implere consilium.

Primasius in 1 Tim. 2.

Constat Deum omnia bona velle, sed homines suo vitio præcipitantur in malum.

Damascenus l. 2. orth. fid. c. 29.

Χρὴ δὲ εἰδήναι, ὡς ὁ Θεὸς προηγουμένως θέλει πάντας σωθῆναι, καὶ τῆς βασιλείας αὐτοῦ τυχεῖν. Οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ κολάσαι ἔπλασεν ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ μεταχεῖν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀγαθός. Ἁμαρτάνοντας δὲ θέλει κολάζεσθαι ὡς δίκαιος. Λέγεται οὖν τὸ πρῶτον προηγούμενον θέλημα, καὶ οὐδοκία ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὄν. Τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἐπόμενον θέλημα, καὶ παραχώρησις ἐξ ἡμετέρας αἰτίας. — ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡ δικαιοσύνη· εἰ γὰρ θέλων κρίνει, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ προηγούμενον θέλημα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἐπόμενον. — καὶ τὸ μὲν προηγούμενον θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ, τῆς ἀγαθότητός ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἐπόμενον, τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ.

Idem contra Manichæos p. 375. edit Basil. 1578. Oecumenius ad 1 Tim. 2.

Ἐι θέλει ὁ Θεὸς [πάντας εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας ἐλθεῖν] τί μὴ γίνεται ὃ θέλει; οὐ γίνεται, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι οὐ θέλουσιν, Οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀνάγκην ποιεῖ ὁ Θεός.

Anselmus in Matth. c. 6.

Duæ sunt voluntates in Deo. Una misericordiæ, *quæ non est cogens, nec aliquid libero arbitrio aufert. Qua omnes homines vult salvos fieri, quod tamen in libera voluntate illorum positum est. Est alia, quæ est de effectibus rerum, de qua dicitur, [omnia quæcunque voluit, fecit.] huic nemo potest resistere. De qua dicitur, Voluntati ejus quis resistit? (atque hæc est duplex,* permittens, *respectu mali;* approbans, *respectu boni.) Itaque homines resistunt* voluntati misericordiæ, *& non resistunt* voluntati justitiæ.

(Postea

(*Postea in hunc sensum.*) *Orate ergo*, fiat voluntas tua, *sicut in cœlo* (*ubi non resistitur*) *sic & in terris, ubi resistitur.*

Deus ex se sumit seminarium miserendi. Quod judicat & condemnat nos, eum quodammodo cogimus, *ut longè aliter de corde ipsius miseratio, quàm animadversio procedere videatur. ---omnibus offertur, & in communi posita est Dei misericordia; nemo illius expers est, nisi qui renuit.*

Bernardus serm. 5. in Natal. Dom. Idem serm. 1. in purif. Mar.

If after all these testimonies, I have *S. Austin* and *Prosper* to side with me in my assertion, I know not why I may not seem, to those who think me in an error, at least to have *rationally* and *discreetly erred*: and though *Grotius* gives a reason why *S. Austin* is the unfitteſt to be a *Judge* in these matters, yet if *Prosper* (who best knew him) may be allowed for his *Interpreter*, I am very well content that he be one of my *Jury*; for of *four Expositions* which that Father made (in several parts of his writings) upon 1 *Tim.* 2. 4. [*God will have all men to be saved,*] I finde *one* very directly just such as I would have it; and it is even in those writings which he pen'd after the Heresie of *Pelagius* was on foot; which is therefore with me of very great *moment* and *Authority*.

Grotius in Rivet. Apolog. Discus. p. 97. 98.

To this Question,

De bonâ voluntate unde sit, si naturâ, cur non omnibus, cùm sit idem Deus omnium Creator? si dono Dei, etiam hoc quare non omnibus, cùm homines velit salvos fieri.

Austin. in lib. de spiritu & literâ ad Marcelllinum c. 33.

He thus Answers,

Vult Deus omnes homines salvos fieri, non sic tamen ut eis adimat liberum arbitrium, *quo vel bene vel malè utentes* justissimè judicentur. *Quod quum sit, Infideles quidem contra voluntatem* Dei *faciunt, cùm ejus Evangelio non credunt: nec ideo tamen eam vincunt, verùm seipsos fraudant magno & summo bono, malisque pœnalibus implicant,*

cant, experturi in ſuppliciis poteſtatem ejus, cujus in donis miſericordiam contemſerunt.

Idem ſerm. 38. de Sanctis.

Inevitabilis illa ſententia, [diſcedite à me maledicti] *à piiſſimo Deo ideo multo autè prædicitur, ut à nobis totis viribus caveatur: ſi enim nos Deus noſter vellet punire, non nos ante tot ſecula commoneret. Invitus quodam modo vindicat, qui quomodo evadere poſſimus, multo antè demonſtrat: non enim te vult percutere, qui tibi clamat,* obſerva.

'Tis very true that S. *Auſtin* did ſometimes let fall ſuch expreſſions, (tranſported ſometimes in the heat of his diſpute) as rais'd ſome calumnies after his death, as if he had thought that *God created the greateſt part of mankinde on purpoſe to do the will, not of God, but of the Devil.* But *Proſper* made it appear, in his Anſwers to *that* and the like Objections, that they who cenſur'd *Auſtin's Judgement*, were ſeduced to it by his *ſtyle:* and that (notwithſtanding the misfortune of his expreſſions) *Auſtin's* judgement and his *owne*, was clearly this (and ſo * *Fulgentius* doth profeſſe to underſtand it.)

* *Nihil aliud accipiendum in iſto Auguſtini ſermone exiſtimo, quo ad interitum quoſdam prædeſtinatos firmat, &c.* Fulgent. ad Monim. l. 1.

Proſper (ſeu Auguſt.) ad object. Vicen. Artic. 2. & ſeqq.

---*Synceriſſimè credendum atque profitendum eſt, Deum velle ut omnes homines ſalvi fiant. Siquidem Apoſtolus, cujus iſta ſententia eſt, ſollicitiſſimè præcipit, ut Deo pro omnibus hominibus ſupplicetur: ex quibus* quòd multi pereunt, pereuntium eſt meritum; *quòd multi ſalvantur, ſalvantis eſt donum.* --- Nemo ab eo ideo creatus eſt, ut periret: *quia* alia eſt cauſa Naſcendi, alia Pereundi. *Vt enim naſcantur homines, conditoris eſt beneficium; ut autem pereant, prævaricatoris eſt meritum.* ---*Inſanum omnino eſt dicere,* Voluntatem Dei ex Dei voluntate non fieri; *& Damnatorem Diaboli ejúſque famulorum, velle ut Diabolo ſerviatur.* ---*Nullo modo credendum homines---ex Dei voluntate cecidiſſe, cùm potius allevet Dominus omnes qui corruunt,*

corruunt, & erigat omnes elisos. ---*Dei ergo voluntas est, ut in bonâ voluntate maneatur.* Qui & priusquam deseratur, neminem deserit. *Et multos* desertores sæpe convertit. ---*Deus nec quæ illuminavit, obcæcat; nec quæ ædificavit, destruit; nec quæ plantavit, evellit.* Quia præsciti sunt casuri, non sunt prædestinati. *Essent* autem prædestinati, si essent reversuri, & in sanctitate ac veritate mansuri: *ac per hoc prædestinatio Dei multis* est Causa standi, nemini est Causa labendi. ---*Hi* cùm à pietate deficiunt, non ex Dei opere, sed ex sua voluntate deficiunt. Casuri *tamen &* recessuri *ab eo, qui falli non potest*, præsciuntur. ---*Denique* qui voluntatem spreverunt invitantem, voluntatem Dei sentient vindicantem.

Ὁ Διάβολος τὴν πρῶτον ἀπατήσας τὴν ἄνθρωπον, θνητὸν τὸ γένος διὰ τῆς ἐκείνου παραβάσεως ἀπειργάσατο. Theodor. Heracl. in Joh. 8. 44.

Anathema illi qui per Dei præscientiam in mortem hominem deprimi dixerit. Synod. Arelatensis.

Suo prorsus decipiuntur Arbitrio, suâ voluntate labuntur, & si in hac desidiâ perseverent, ipsi se his quæ accepere, despoliant. Scriptor de vocat. Gent. l. 2. cap. 11.

Quos præscivit Deus homines vitam in peccato terminaturos, prædestinavit supplicio interminabili puniendos. Fulgentius ad Monimum. l. 1.

* Lastly, that this is precisely the Judgement of the *Church of England*, I cannot better prove then by that *sense* and *apprehension* which *Bishop Overal* had of it; who does professedly interpret the *minde* of her *Articles* in this particular, and was as well able to do it, as any man that ever liv'd.

---*Sub* generali *promissione & præcepto tutò quisque potest indubiâ fide se includere: & cum certâ spe ac fiduciâ ad thronum gratiæ accedere, veréque cognoscere, si* [illegible] confi-

* *Causam Reprobationis certum est hanc esse, viz. peccatum in hominibus.* Melancthon in locis Theolog. de prædest. p. 316. 317. *Idem ubiq; ait* Petrus Molinæus in sua anatome Arminianismi. D. *Overallus Theol. Cantab. professor de sententiâ Ecclesiæ Anglic. &c. cap. 1.*

dat *Deo* promittenti, & mandanti obſequatur, ſuam culpam eſſe, *non Dei*: *idque per* negligentiam ſuam, non gratiæ divinæ defectum accidere. ---*Ordo divinæ prædeſtinationis noſtræ in Articulo ſeptimo iſte videtur intentus*; *Deum præſcium lapſus generis humani ad remedium ejuſdem filium mittendum decrevisſe, in eóque* ſalutis conditionem *ſtatuiſſe*; *tum ad eam in animis hominum producendam* neceſſaria & ſufficientia *media & auxilia* omnibus generatim *ſecundum* magis & minus *ordinâſſe, quæ* magis ſpeciatim *his quos in Chriſto elegit ex reliquo hominum genere pro ſuo beneplacito cumularet, quibus hi ad fidem, perſeverantiam & æternam ſalutem certiſſimè perducantur, &* reliqui nihil habeant quod conquerantur, &c.

Cap. 2. de morte Chriſti. *De morte Chriſti tam plena & ubiq; ſibi conſtans Eccleſiæ noſtræ ſententia*, pro omnibus omnino hominibus, *ſive pro* omnibus omnium hominum peccatis, *Jeſum Chriſtum mortuum eſſe, ut* mirandum ſit ullos ex noſtris id in controverſiam vocare.

Artic. 2. *Pro omnibus actualibus hominum peccatis, non tantùm pro culpâ Originis.*

Artic. 7. *Æterna vita humano generi eſt propoſita.*

Artic. 31. *Oblatio Chriſti ſemel facta perfecta eſt Redemptio, propitiatio & ſatisfactio pro omnibus peccatis totius mundi tam originalibus quàm actualibus.*

Calvin. ad Heb. 9. 28. *Idem ad Rom. 5.* It is farther obſerv'd by that moſt moderate and learned man, that Mr. *Calvin himſelf*, however *rigid* he was in *ſome* places, did yet ſo *ſoberly* contradict himſelf in *others*, that thoſe very texts of Scripture in which it is affirmed [*Chriſt dyed for many*] he ſo interprets as to ſay, the word [*many*] ſignifie's [*all*] as *Heb. 9. 28.* and that many are not ſaved is (ſaith he) for this reaſon, [*quia eos impedit ſua incredulitas*] *becauſe they are hindred by their own incredulity.*

19. I have not translated these Authorities, because they are principally meant for such as are able to understand them. And if any *plain Reader* shall desire to have them in the *Grosse* without being troubled to suffer them over in the *Retail*, he may be pleas'd to receive it in these following words: *That God did not absolutely, irrespectively, unconditionally decree the everlasting misery of any one, but in a foresight and intuition of their refusing his proffer. That he sent his son to dye for all the sins of the whole world, inviting and commanding all men every where to repent* [and be forgiven] (Act. 17. 30.) *but that most, like the slave in* Exodus, *are in love with their bondage; and will be bored through the ear. That everlasting fire was prepared especially,* (*not for men, but*) *for the Devil and his Angels; nor for them by a peremptory irrespective Decree, but in præscience and respect of their pride and Apostasie. That Christ came to save that which was lost, and to call sinners to Repentance, and to have gather'd them as a Hen gathereth her Chickens under her wings, but they would not. That God gave his law, his rule, his promises to all, and excepted none in the publishing of either; but so as he expected they should be willing as well as he; for he would not save any whether they would or no. That God Almighty made no man on purpose to torment him, but that he might participate of his goodnesse.* "*That so many as perish may* "*thank themselves; and that so many as live for ever, are* "*beholding to nothing but the Grace of God. That God* "*Decreed the fall of none, but the raising up of those were* "*down: and that those very men who are reprobated had* "*been predestin'd to salvation, if they would have return'd* "*and remain'd in truth and holinesse. Gods Decrees being* "*to many the cause of their rise, but to none of their down-*

The *English Reader* may be pleas'd to observe, that these last words are translated out of *Prosper* in his vindication of *Augustine* his deareſt *friend*, who is the only Father (I can hear of) whom our *Adversaries* are willing to be *tryed* by in this business. (See the Confession of Dr. *Twiss. in Vindic. Grat. l.* 1. *Dign.* 8. §. 4. *p.* 110.

"*fal. Lastly, that they who have despis'd the will of God*
"*which did invite them to repentance, shall feel the terrors*
"*of his will, which is to execute vengeance upon the children*
"*of disobedience.*

The Result of all.

20. From all this together which hath been said from *Scripture*, from *Reason*, from the *Authority* of the *Ancients*, (who are sure the most fit to *interpret* Scripture) I thus conclude within my self. That *God Almighty* is the *Author* of *men* and *Angels*; That *wicked Angels* and *wicked men* are the *Authors* of *sin*; and that the *sin* of *men* and *Angels* is the *Author* of unexpressible and *endlesse punishment*. That *sin* is *Rebellion* against the *Majesty* of God: That *hell* was made to punish *Rebels*; and that God never *decreed* any *Rebellion against himself*. From whence it followes, that as I look for the *Cause* of my *election*, in the *sole merits* of my *Redeemer*, so for the *cause* of my *Reprobation*, in the *obliquity* of my *will*: because the *Reason* of my *punishment* is to be taken from my *sin*; and the *Reason* of my *sin* is to be taken from my *self*: from whence there followes (and follow it *will*, do what I *can*) A *second Inference* from my *first*, *Compared with my first Principle*, viz.

Ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἄνθρωποι ποιοῦσι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἁμαρτάνουσιν, οὐδ' ἂν ἀσεβεῖς, εἰ θεοὶ ἐποίουν. *Plotin. Enn. l. 2. p. 263.*

Αὐθαίρετα πήματ' ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ πῶς τλήμονες καὶ τάλανες τῶν ἑαυτῶν ὠρέσεσι γίνονται. *Hierocl. εἰς τὰ χρυσ. ἔπ. p. 258.*

CHAP. III.

The second Inference.

21. THat *every Reprobate* is *predetermin'd* to *eternal punishment*, not by Gods *irrespective*, but *conditional Decree*.

God

God does punish no man under the notion of a *Creature*, but under that of a *Malefactor*: and because he does not *create* a *malefactor*, but a *man*, he hateth nothing he hath *created*, but in as much as it hath *wilfully* (as it were) *uncreated* his *image* in it. So that no man is *sinfull*, because *ordain'd* to *condemnation*; but *ordain'd* to *condemnation*, because he is *sinful*. Sin is *foreseen*, and *punishment foreappointed*; but because that *sin* is the *cause* of *punishment*, and that the *cause* is not *after*, but *before* the *effect*, (in priority of *nature*, though not of *time*,) it followes that the *effect* cannot be *foreappointed*, until the *Cause* is *foreseen*. So that God *condemn's* no man by an *absolute decree*, (that is to say) *without respect*, or *intuition* of any *sin*; but the *præscience* of the *Guilt*, is the *motive* and *inducement* to the *determining* of the *Judgement*. And yet however my *second Inference* is depending upon my *first* by an *essential tye*, (which gives it the *force* and *intrinsick form of Demonstration*) yet because some *Readers* will assent much sooner, to a *plain Reason* lesse convincing, then to a more *convincing Reason* lesse plain, (and that some are wrought upon, by an argument *proportion'd* to their *Capacities*, or *Tempers*, rightly *level'd* and *adapted* more by *luckinesse*, then *design*, whilst another argument is *displeasing* they know not why, but that there is an *odnesse* in the *look* and *meen* which betokens something of *subtilty*, and makes them suspect there is a *serpent*, though they see not the *Ambush* in which it *lurks*) I will gratifie *such a Reader* by a proof of *this* too; first from *Scripture*, then from *Reason* (grounded upon *Scripture*) and last of all by an addition to my former suffrages of *Antiquity*: in which *S. Austin* more especially shall speak *as plainly*, and as *strongly* in my behalf, as any man

Explain'd.

that can be *brib'd* to be an *Advocate*, or a *witnesse*.

Proved by Scripture.

22. That my proof from *Scripture* may be the more effectual I shall first desire it may be consider'd; that since God is affirmed to have a *secret*, and a *reveal'd will*, we must not præposterously interpret what we *read* of his *reveal'd will*, by what we *conjecture* of his *secret* one: (for that were to go into the *dark*, to judge of those *Colours* which are seen only by the *light*) but we must either not *conjecture* at that which cannot be *known* (as Gods *secret* will cannot be, but by ceasing to be *secret*) or if we needs will be so *busie*, we must *guesse* at his *secret* will by what we *know* of his *reveal'd* one, that so at least we may *modestly* and *safely* erre. Upon which it followes: that we who meekly confesse we have not been of Gods *Councill*, must only judge of his *eternal and imperveſtigable Decrees*, by what we find in his *Word* concerning his *Promises* and his *Threats*: which are fitly call'd the *Transcripts*, *or Copies of his Decrees*. Such therefore as are his *Threats*, such must needs be his *Decrees*, (because the one cannot *prævaricate* or *evacuate* the other) but his *Threats* (as well as *Promises*) are all *conditional*, therefore his *decrees* must be so too.

Gen. 2. 17. Thus in his *Covenant* with *Adam* (and indeed the *word Covenant* doth evince what I am speaking) he *threatens* Death, or *decrees* it, (not with that peremptory Reason, which is the *redoubling* of the *will* only, *I will therefore, because I will*, but) on supposition of his *eating* the *forbidden* fruit. Which was not *therefore forbidden*, that *Adam* might *sin* in the *eating*; (*man* was not so *ensnared* by the *guide of his youth*) but *Adam sin'd* in the *eating*, because the Fruit had been *forbidden*. Such immediately

Chap 4. v. 7. after, was Gods language unto *Cain*. [*If thou* dost well, thou

thou shall be accepted, and *if thou* dost not well, sin lyeth at the door.) Again (saith *God* by the *mouth* of *Moses*) Behold, I set before you this Day a *Blessing* and a *Curse*. *A Blessing, if ye obey*; and *a Curse, if ye will not obey*. That is the form of making *Covenants* betwixt *God* and *man*, every where throughout the Scriptures and according to the *fulfilling* or *not fulfilling* of the *Condition*, the *Righteous Judge* of all the *world* proceeds to *sentence*. Which that we may not so much as *doubt* of, He (by a merciful *Anthropopathia*) is pleas'd to speak *like one of us*. *I will go down now and see, whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it, and if not, I will know*. There is an expression of God to *Eli* (1 *Sam.* 30.) which shewes his will sometimes is either *not absolute*, or *not immutable*. *I said indeed that the House of thy Father should walk before me forever. But now the Lord saith, Be it far from me*. Which words do not argue any *fickleness* in his *Will*, but demonstrate his *Promise* to be *conditionall*: an [*If*] was *impli'd*, though not *express'd*, and so it appears by the very next words. This is also the style that is us'd in the *New Testament*. *If thou shalt confesse with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt beleeve in thine heart, &c. thou shalt be saved*. From whence it followes, that *if* thou shalt *not* confesse with thy mouth, *nor* beleeve in thine heart, &c. *thou shalt be damn'd*. *If we forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses*. If *we suffer, we shall also reign; if we deny him, he also will deny us*. I will cast her into a bed, and them that commit fornication with her, into great tribulation, *except they repent* (Rev. 2. 22.) *If ye beleeve not that I am he*, ye shal dye *in your sins*, Joh. 8. 24. In a word, the very end of Christs coming into the world, was to *save us*

Deut. 11. 16. 27.

Gen. 18. 21.

Rom. 10. 9.

Mat. 6. 15.

2 Tim. 2. 12. Rev. 2. 22. Joh. 8. 24. 2 Thes. 1. 7. 8. Mar. 16. 16.

from

Mat. 1. 21. Tit. 2. 14. *from our ſins,* (Mat. 1. 21,) *to redeem us from all iniquity.* (Tit. 2. 14.) He came to deliver us indeed out of the hand of our enemies, *but to the end that we might ſerve him in holineſſe and righteouſneſſe all the daies of our lives.* (Luk. 1. 74. 75.) Now the *end* (we know) is the *prime condition,* the *greateſt requiſite* of all: which to neglect without repentance, is the *true Cauſe* of *condemnation*: for ſo runs the *ſentence* of our Saviour (Mat. 25. 41.) *Depart from me ye curſed into everlaſting fire.* Why? for what *Reaſon?* He gives the *reaſon* in the next verſe, (not becauſe ye were *Reprobated* by an *abſolute decree*; not becauſe ye were *ordain'd* to be *veſſels of wrath* by a meer *irreſpective* and *inexorable will*, but) *becauſe I was hungry and ye gave me no meat, becauſe I was thirſty and ye gave me no drink.* (Which yet they could not have given him, if it had not been *given* them from above to *give.*) From which and a thouſand ſuch Texts beſides, I do thus ſtate the matter betwixt me and my ſelf. That none is *infinitely puniſht* by an *unavoidable neceſſity*, but for *not doing his duty*; nor becauſe he *cannot*, but *will not do it.* *Impoſſibility* is not a *ſin*, and therefore no man is *puniſht* for *not doing that*, which 'tis *impoſſible* for him *to do.* It was the cruelty of *Adonibezek*, to cut off mens Thumbs, and then to make it *their task* to *gather up meat under the Table.* A greater cruelty in *Pharaoh*, to require *a Tale of brick*, where he gave *no ſtraw.* Whereas the *maſter* we *ſerve*, will *render to every man according to his works.* *With him there is no reſpect of perſons.* *But whatſoever a man ſoweth, that ſhall he reap.* And therefore let us not *ſin*, under pretence that all we do is by an *abſolute Decree*: (an *opinion* brought, amongſt *other Merchandiſe*, out of *Turkie* into *Chriſtendome*, and would be rooted

Mat. 25, 41. 42.

Luk. 1. 74. 75.

Judg. 1. 7.

Rom. 2. 6. 11. Gal. 6. 7.

rooted out in the next *Reformation*) for every such sinner is his own *worst Satan, he seeks out death in the errour of his way, and puls upon himself Destruction with the works of his hands.* Wisd. 1. 12.

Other proofs out of Scripture, (and to some more convincing) will be found interweav'd in my following proofs.

33. I must next confirm this truth by *Reason*; and because this *Reason* will be *manifold*, I will make it my endeavour to be brief in *each*. Whereof the *first* shall be taken * from the *nature of punishment*, which (as before I signified) does præsuppose sin; sin does imply a *breach of Law*; and this again does imply, at once *a rational and a voluntary agent*. Which seems to me to be the Reason, why God is not offended with the *Cruelty of the Bear*, or with the *Pride* of the *Peacock*, or with the *Theevery* of the *Fox*. And why the *Earth* does not *sin* by breeding *Thornes and Thistles* against its *primitive Institution*. For the *ground* cannot be *punisht*, and was not *cursed* for its *own*, but for *Adam*'s sake only. (Gen. 3. 17. 18.) And lastly, this is the Reason, why the *Tower* of *Siloe* was not *Damn'd* for committing *murder*. *Man* is an *Agent* very capable of a *Law*, and so of *sin*, and so of *punishment*; and is *therefore* punisht, not because he *could not*, but because he *could* help it, by that *goodnesse of God* which would have *led him to repentance*, if he had not *despis'd the riches of his goodnesse*. Man is punisht because he *would* sin, and not because he *could not but sin*. *Proved secondly by Reason.*

* Note, Reader, that the *Execution* of God's Decree justly *answering* to his *Decree*, does shew the Reason of the *Reasons* which now Ensue; & is therefore noted in the Margin, because some have not conceived it as implyed in the Text. Rom. 2. 4. 5.

24. My *second Reason* is taken from the *nature* of a *Covenant*; which ever implies *a Condition*: now when the *first Covenant* was broken, God *immediately* made a *se-*

cond; not with *a part*, but with *all mankinde*. And this is observable in the *Title* of our *Gospel*; [ἡ καινὴ διαθήκη] which though we render the [*New Testament*] we might better render the (*New Covenant*) which cannot be without *Conditions*. *Heaven* and *Hell* are set before us; the performance of *Faith* and *Obedience*, is that important *condition*; without which, as the former will not be had, so cannot the latter be avoided.

25. My *third Reason* is taken from the *unlimited Generality* whereby *Promises and Threats, Rewards and Punishments, Exhortations and Dehortations*, are exhibited to * *all*. The *Gospel* is commanded to be *preached* unto *all*; and it is published in *writing*, that *all* might read and beleeve; *Baptisme, Repentance*, and *Remission* of sins are commanded to be *offer'd* to *all in general*, even to them that *refuse* both the *Word and the Preachers*. Who *when* they are refus'd (and not before) are *to shake the Dust off their feet for a Testimony against them*. Now *preachings* would be *vain*, and *exhortations* would be *deceitful*, if *life* and *death* did not *depend* upon *submitting* or *refusing* to be amended by them.

* Rev. 22. 17. Act. 17. 27. Mat. 28. 19. Luk. 24. 47. Joh. 20. 31. Luk. 9. 5.

26. My *fourth Reason* is taken from the *Degrees of Damnation*. Some shall be beaten with *many stripes*, and some with *fewer*; some shall have a *lesse*, and some a *greater Condemnation*. It shall be worse for *Chorazin* then for *Tyre*, worse for *Bethsaida* then for *Sidon*, worse for *Capernaum* then for *Sodom*, worse for the *Jewes* then for the *Ninevites*; which is not because one had a greater *Necessity* of sinning then the other, but one was guilty of the greater *Contempt*. Not because God had *absolutely Decreed a greater Punishment* to the one, but because the one had *means* of *sinning lesse* then the other. For our

Luk. 12. 47. Cap. 20. v. 47. Mat. 11. 20. 21. 23. 24. Mat. 10. 15.

our Saviour sayes expresly, that if the *mighty works* which were done in *Chorazin* and *Bethsaida*, had been also done in *Tyre* and *Sidon*, they would have *repented in Sackcloth and Ashes*. Which was as much as to tell them, that it was not at all for want of *means and of mercy* on Gods part, but for want of *will* on *theirs*, that they did not *do* what was *commanded* to be *don*. And therefore our Saviour *did upbraid them, because they repented not*, (Mat. 11. 20.) which he could not have don, had it been *impossible* for them to have repented. Our blessed Saviour was *too pitiful*, and of too *sweet* a *disposition*, to *jeer* a *poor Creature* for being *such* as God *made* him, or for being such as he *could not but be*, whether by *fatal*, or by *natural infirmity*. We esteem it an *ill nature* to upbraid a *stammerer* for *not speaking plain*; nor is any man *reproached* for being *naturally*, but *wilfully blind*; nor for being *born deaf*, but for being like *the Adder that stoppeth her ears*. He that *bindes* my *feet*, and then *invites* me to *come* to him, *intends* me nothing for *entertainment* but a *salted Sarcasme*, or *bitter Jest*; for if he were *serious*, he would set my *feet* at *liberty*, that I might come in *good earnest*; and not say to me, as we say to a Child that is *fallen down*, [*Come hither to me, and I will lift thee up.*] And yet this Mr. *Calvin* is fain to say, (having been first of all ingaged in that opinion) *That so many nations of men, together with their infants, were involved without remedy in eternal punishment, by the fall of Adam, for no imaginable reason, but that so it seemed good in the sight of God*: and being pincht with that Text (Ezek. 18. 23.) *Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die, and not that he should return from his waies and live?* he is fain to say, *That God wils not the Death of a sinner, so far forth as he*

Joh. 3. 19. Psal. 58. 4.

Calvinus in Institut. l. 3. cap. 23. §. 7.

Mortem non vult Deus, in quantum vult pœnitentiam. Sed experientia docet, ita eam velle, ut cor peccatoris non tangat. Idem in Ezek. 18.

wils his Repentance. *Which experience teacheth us he doth ſo will, as not to touch his heart that he may repent.* Which is all one as to ſay, *he wils it* ſo as to *command it*; but he does *not will it ſo*, as to *leave it poſſible*: (that is) he wils it in *ſhew*, but not in *reality*. Nor do I know any way poſſible for Mr. *Calvin* to *eſcape* thoſe *ugly ſequels* unleſſe by ſaying, [that the *ſinner* may *repent* by the *ſtrength* and *force* of *Nature*, without the *touch* of his heart by the *grace of God*,] which is to *ſhelter* himſelf under the *Hereſie* of *Pelagius*. *Solomon* gives us a more *rationall accompt*, why *Wiſdome* one day will *laugh* at mens *calamities*, and *mock* when their *fear cometh*, even becauſe they *hated knowledge* and did *not chooſe the fear of the Lord*.

Prov. 1. 16. 29.

27. My *fifth Reaſon* is taken from the *nature* of *Death*, as that does ſignifie *Privation*, and as *Privation* ſuppoſes a former *Habit*. A ſtone is ſaid to be *not alive*, becauſe it ſuffers the *Negation of life*; but a ſtone cannot properly be ſaid to be *dead*, becauſe it doth not ſuffer the *Privation* of *life*. So that when a man is ſaid in *Scripture* to be ſpiritually *dead* in Treſpaſſes and *Sins*, he is imply'd by that expreſſion to have been ſpiritually *alive*. And no man is damn'd for the *Negation*, but the *Privation of Grace*; becauſe the *Negation of Grace* would *be Gods work*, whereas the *Privation* of it is his *own*. It having formerly been ſhew'd, That God doth not puniſh his *own work* in man, but man is puniſht for his *own work*; not for *Gods illiberality*, but for *his own* being *a prodigal*; not becauſe *no Talent* was *given* him, but becauſe he *ſquander'd it away*. *Sin* is properly the *Death* of *Grace*; *Death* is a *privation*, a *privation* is of an *habit*. So that every ſinner *had grace*, for this very Reaſon that he *hath loſt* it; he *was alive*, for this very Reaſon that he is *dead*.

Luke. 19. 13. 20.

He

He came *alive* out of *Gods hands*, but he fals desperately by his *own*. A man indeed may be *dead born*; but he cannot possibly be *dead begotten*; *deprived of life* he cannot be in the very Act of his *conception*. A man can no more be *created a sinner*, then he can be *generated* a *dead man*: which infers the *Condition* of Gods *Decree*.

28. My *sixth Reason* is taken from Christs having *bought* those very men (2 Pet. 2. 1.) *whose damnation did not slumber*. (vers. 3.) I have prov'd already, *Christ died for all that were dead in Adam*, from (2 Cor. 5. 14.) and from several other Texts. Which he could not be truly affirm'd to do, *had* any *one* been past by, by an *absolute Præterition*. For that any man doth perish for whom Christ dyed, is from his *own sin*, and *not* from *Adams*, if to free us *from Adams* it was that *Christ died*. Which as it hath been already prov'd, so it may be confirm'd from other *Scriptures*: as from 1 Joh. 2. 2. where he is call'd *the propitiation, not for our sins only, but also for the sins of the whole world*. The Apostle *foresees* and *confutes* the Heresie of Christs dying *only for the Elect*, with a *not only, but also*. *He died for Infidels* and *impenitents*, as the whole stream of the *Fathers* conclude from those words, *Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died*. *And shall thy weak brother perish for whom Christ died*? That this was the Judgement of the *primitive Church*, I can prove by an *Induction*, and though I now *spare* my *Reader*, yet I shall *trouble* him hereafter if *Challeng'd* to it. I shall at present refer him to the 31 *Article* of *our Church of England*. "[The *oblation of* "*Christ* once made is a *perfect Redemption, propitiation*, "and *satisfaction* for *all the sins* of the *whole world*, as well *Original*

1 Joh. 2. 2.

Rom. 14. 15.
1 Cor. 8. 11.

" *Original* as *Actual.*] I had almoſt forgot *a ſpecial* Teſtimony of *S. John*, who cals the *Meſſias* [*the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the World.*] So that if any man is in the *Dark*, it is not for *want of Light*, but becauſe he *will not ſee*, (as *S. Chryſoſtome* infers) which is the very interpretation that *S. John* himſelf gives it (chap. 3. verſ. 9.) *This* (ſayes he) *is the Condemnation, that light is come into the World, and men loved darkneſſe rather then light, becauſe their Deeds were evil.* Sure that which is the *Reaſon* of their *Condemnation*, was the *Condition* upon *which* they were *determin'd* to be *damn'd*: then which I know not what can be ſaid either *more plainly*, or *more convincingly* of *any ſubject* whatſoever.

Joh. 1. 9.

Cap. 3. v. 19.

29. My *ſeventh* Reaſon is taken from the *conditional Decrees of temporal Death, and other temporal puniſhments*; which are ſo *evidently Conditional*, as I cannot beleeve any Creature will deny it. The Denuntiations of *Deſtruction* to *Nineveh*, and of *certain death* to *Hezekiah*, do put this quite out of all *ſcruple*. For the firſt was *not deſtroy'd*, and the ſecond did *not die*, at that *determinate time* when God had threatned that they *ſhould*. Of which no reaſon can be given, but that Gods *Purpoſes*, and *Decrees*, and *Threats* were *conditional* on ſuppoſition of their *Impenitence* to *deſtroy*, and therefore on *ſight* of their *Repentance* he promis'd to preſerve. And from hence it is natural to argue thus. *Is God ſo merciful* to *bodies?* and is he *leſſe merciful* to *ſouls?* Does he decree *temporal Judgemeuts conditionally*, becauſe he is *pitiful?* and will he decree *Eternal ones abſolutely*, meerly *becauſe he will?* Is he ſo *unwilling* to inflict the *firſt death*, and will he ſhew his *power*, his *abſolute power* in the *ſecond?* Did he *ſpare* the *Ninevites* in *this life*, becauſe they were *penitents?*

Jonah. 3, 4, 10.

2 Kin. 20. 5.

penitents? and will he *damn* them in the *next*, because they were *Heathens*, by his *peremptory Decree*? Is he mild in *small things*, and *severe* in the *greatest*? Is there no other way to understand those Texts in *the 9. to the Romans*, then by making those Texts which sound *severely*, to clash against those that sound *compassionately*? Is it not a more *sober* and a more *reasonable Course*, to interpret *hard* and *doubtful* Texts by a far greater number more *clear and easie*, then perversly to interpret a *clear* Text by a *doubtful* one, or an *easie* text by one that's *difficult*? which is to *shew* the light by the *darkness*. Or if some Texts have *two senses*, if some are liable to *many more*, must we *needs* take them in the *worst*? and that in *meer contradiction* to the *universal Church*; If I had no other Argument against an *absolute* Reprobation, this one were sufficient to prevail with me, That *that Father of mercies* and *God of all consolation*, who *spareth* when we *deserve punishment*, did not *determine* us to *punishment without respect* to our *indeservings*. He that had mercy on wicked *Ahab* meerly because of his *Attrition*, did not *absolutely damn* him before he had don either *good* or *evill*, before the *foundations of the world were laid*. *He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children men*, (Lam. 3. 33.) much lesse doth he *damn* them for his *meer will and pleasure*. When God doth execute a *temporal punishment*, upon such as *already have deserv'd it*, he comes to it with *reluctation*, (ἐκὼν ἀέκοντί γε θυμῷ) and therefore cals it his * *strange work*, a work he loves not to be *acquainted with*, a work which he sometimes does execute, because he is *Just*; but still * *unwillingly*, because he is *compassionate*. And he therefore *so* expresses it, as we are wont to do a thing we are not *us'd to*, and know not *how to set about*,

1 Kin. 21. 29.

* Isa 28 21.

* Lam 3 33.

Hos. 11. 8. 9. about, [*How shall I give thee up, Ephraim? how shall I deliver thee, Israel? how shall I make thee as Admah? how shall I set thee as Zeboim? Mine heart is turn'd within me, my Repentings are kindled together. I will not execute*
Exod. 32. 14. *the fierceness of mine anger, I am God, and not man.*] Now that God doth professe to *afflict unwillingly*, and many times *to repent him of the evil which he thought to do unto his people*, is a *demonstrative* argument of his *Conditional decree*, in things *Temporal*, and, by a greater force of Reason, in things *Eternal*.

30. My *eighth Reason* is taken from the *little flock* which belongs to God, and the *herd* which belongs to *Satan*. Which would not have been, if they had both been measur'd out by *a most absolute Decree*. For when it pleas'd the *Divine goodnesse* to suffer death upon the Crosse for all the sins of the world, (the *every drop* of whose bloud had been *sufficiently precious* to have *purchased the Redemption* of *ten thousand Adams*, and *ten thousand worlds* of his *posterity*) he would not yeeld the *major part* unto his impudent *Rival*, the *black prince of Darknesse*; reserving to himself the far *lesser portion*; and all this *irrespectively*, meerly because *he would*. He would not *absolutely determine* such a general *Harvest* of *Wheat* and *Tares*, as freely to yeeld the Devil the *greater crop*. He would not suffer his *Justice* so to *triumph* over his *Mercy*, who loves
Jam. 2. 13. that *his Mercy should rejoyce against Judgement*. It was not for want of a new *Instance*, to shew his *Power*, or his *Justice*; for they were *both* most eminent in the great *Mysterie of Redemption*. Much *greater Instances and Arguments*, then an *Absolute Decree*; as I could *evidently* shew, if I were but sure of my *Readers patience*.

My *ninth Reason* is taken from the Reprobation of *Angels*,

Angels, which was not irrespective, but in regard to their Apostasie, as is, and must be confessed, by all who place the object of Reprobation in *massâ corruptâ*. For the overthrowing of which Tenet (in all the *Sublapsarians*) Dr. *Twisse* himself does thus argue. *Si Deus non potuit Angelos reprobare, nisi ut contumaces, ergo nec homines nisi ut in contumaciâ perseverantes.* De Prædest. Digres. 4. § 4. c. 2. 31. My *tenth Reason* is taken from the *Absurdities* which *have*, and *still must* follow, if Gods *eternall decree* of mans *misery* is not *conditional*, but *absolute*. And those *absurdities* are discernible, by this following *Dilemma*.

Let *Dives* be suppos'd to be the man that is Damn'd. It is either because he *sins*, or *meerly* because *God will have it so*. If for the *first* Reason, [*because he sins*] then *sin* is the *Cause* of his *Damnation* and consequently *before it*. From whence it followes, that *Dives* is not *Damn'd* meerly because God will *have it so*; but that God will *have it so*, because he *sins*. (Which plainly shew's the *Conditional Decree*.) But if it be said that it is for the [*second Reason, meerly because God will have it so*] then that *absolute Decree* to have it so, doth either *necessitate* him to *sin damnably*, or it *does not*. First, if it *does*, then how can *Dives* be guilty of that thing, of which Gods *absolute Decree* is the *peremptory Cause*? Or how can that be *guilt*, which is *necessity*? (*Dives* could as little have cherisht *Lazarus*, as the *Tower of Siloe* could have spar'd the *Galilæans*, had not his *will* been more *free*, then that *Tower* had a *will*.) And *secondly*, *if it does not* necessitate him to sin damnably, then *Dives* who is *Damn'd* might possibly have *not been damn'd*. From whence it follows, That *Dives* is not Damn'd *absolutely*, but in *regard* to his *sins*. (Which

had they not been *his choise*, had not been *his*, but *his that chose them*. And it is a *Contradiction*, to say, a man *chooses* any thing, *without a free will*, or by an *absolute necessity*, which is, *whether he will or no.*) Besides; if God did *absolutely decree* the *end*, which is *Damnation*, and consequently the *means*, which is *final impenitence*; these Absurdities would follow. *First*, it would be a *Reprobates duty* to be *damn'd*. And to *endeavour* his *salvation* would be a *sin*. Because 'twere striving *against the stream* of Gods *absolute will*. If all men are to *choose*, and withall *to execute* the *will of God*, and that it is Gods *will* that the *greatest part* shall be *damn'd*; it will then be a duty in the *greatest part* of men, to *go industriously to Hell*. And to *do good* will be a *vice*, because it tends *Heavenwards*, and so to the Crossing of an *absolute irreversible Decree*. Which since I have consider'd, I have lesse wondred then I was wont, at the conclusion of *Carpocrates*, that *the very worst of Actions are out of duty to be perform'd. And that the soul shall be punisht with its imprisonment in the body, untill she hath fill'd up the number of her iniquities*; according to that Text *Mat.* 5. 29. Which we call *Iniquities*, but they *Duties*. And so indeed they would be, if every thing in the world (the *means* as well as the *end*) were *absolutely ordain'd*, and by consequence *effected* by God (blessed for ever) who can *ordain* nothing but *good*. And such *sin* and *Hell* must be [*exceeding good*] if they could possibly be *ordain'd* by as *absolute a decree*, as the Heavens and the earth, the water, and the Air, of which God said, *they are very good*. *Secondly*, Gods *Revealed will* being that *all* should repent, and his *Secret will* being that very *few* shall; it followes thence, *That it is his will his will should not be don.*

And

And that God hath *one will* which is the same with the *Devils*; and that when a *Reprobate* saies in the *Pater noster* [thy will be don] he vehemently *prayes* for his *own Damnation*. Which things, as they were falsly objected in *France* against *S. Austin*, so *Prospers* way to excuse him, was to make *protestations* against any such *Tenet*, as *unconditional Reprobation*. He sayes the very things in his *Masters vindication*, which I have said in my *own*. And cals the *sequels* of that *opinion* which he disowns, *most sottish blasphemies*, and not only *prodigious*, but *Devilish lies*. But he denies not at all, that such ill *consequences* will *follow*, upon the bold assertion of *irrespective reprobation*, which he does therefore very *distinctly*, and very *earnestly disclaim*. And he does so much speak the very *mind* of *S. Austin*, that he seems sometimes to speak out of his *mouth* too: it being hard to say, whether the *Answers to the Objections of Vincentius* do truly belong to the *Master*, or to the *Scholar*, they being inserted in *both their Works*. And that which is call'd *Prospers* by *Gerhard Vossius*, is ascrib'd to *S. Austin* by *Ludovicus Lucius*. If I have made any unfriendly or *injurious inference*, I will *instantly retract it* upon the least *conviction* that so it is. But truly the Reasons which I have given, have serv'd to confirm me in my adhærence to my *second Inference*. Which I yet farther prove by the *remaining votes of Antiquity*. For though my *former Citations* are all to this purpose, yet I will not *repeat* them, but add some others, (perhaps more *fully* and *indisputably*) to the number.

Ineptissimæ blasphemiæ. Prodigiosa mendacia. Diabolicum mendaciorum indiculus. Leguntur apud. Prosp. in Præfat. Respon. ad object. Vinc.

32. * And first I will set down the Confession of Mr. *Calvin*, *That the Schoolmen and Ancients are wont to say*, [*Gods Reprobation of the wicked, is in præscience of their*

* *Proved thirdly by Antiquity. Solent veteres &c. & Scholastici in eâ acquiescunt &c. Non aliâ ratione quæ futura sunt, prævideat, nisi qui ita ut fierent decrevit.* Calvin. instit. l. 3. c. 23. §. 6.

wickedneſſe] but he profeſſes to beleeve (with *one* more *modern*) *that God foreſaw all future things, by no other means, then becauſe he decreed they ſhould be made, or don. Nor ought it* (ſaith he) *to ſeem abſurd, That God did not only foreſee, but by his will appoint the fall of Adam, and in him of his poſterity.* *The Ancients*, he confeſſed, were quite of *another mind*, but becauſe he adds [*dubitanter*] and would have it thought that S. *Auſtin* was for his turn, I will ſet down ſome of *their* words, & begin with *Auſtins*.

Nec abſurdum videri debet, Deũ non modò primi hominis Caſum & in eo poſterorum ruinam prævidiſſe, ſed arbitrio quoq; ſuo diſpenſaſſe. Idem ibid. §. 7.

33. No man is choſen unleſſe as differing from him that is rejected. Nor know I how it is ſaid [that God hath choſen us before the foundation of the world] unleſſe it be meant of his præſcience of faith and good works. --- *Jacob* was not choſen that he might be made good, but having been ſeen to be made good was capable of being choſen.

Nemo eligitur niſi jam diſtans ab illo qui rejicitur. Unde quod dictum eſt, [quia elegit nos Deus ante mundi Conſtitutionem] non video quomodo ſit dictum, niſi de præſcientiâ Fidei & operum pietatis. & mox --- Jacobus non electus eſt ut fieret bonus, ſed bonus factus eligi potuit. Auguſtin. ad Simplicianum l. 1. quæſt. 2.

If S. *Auſtin* was ſo diſtinctly for *Conditional Election* (and in thoſe very works too, which he afterwards writ as very ſufficient to confute *Pelagius*) he was infinitely *rather* for *Conditional Reprobation*. As any man knows that knows any thing of him; and may be ſeen in the ſame book to *Simplician*.

Eſau would not, and did not run. For if he had, he had attain'd by the help of God; unleſſe he would be made a Reprobate by a contempt of his vocation.

Noluit ergo Eſau, & non cucurrit. Sed & ſi voluiſſet, & cucurriſſet, Dei adjutorio perveniſſet, niſi vocatione contemptâ reprobus fieret. Id. in lib. ad Simpl.

It

It seems unjust, that without the merits of good or evil works, God should love one, and hate another. *Num quid iniquitas est apud Deum ?*

absit. Iniquum enim videtur, ut sine ullis bonorum malorúmve operum meritis, unum Deus eligat, odiátq; alterum. Id. in Enchirid. cap. 98.

Wicked men had no necessity of perishing from their not being elected; but they were therefore not elected, because they were forc seen to be wicked through their own wilful prevarication. *Non necessitatem pereundi habuerunt, quia prædestinati non sunt; sed ideo prædestinati non sunt, quia tales futuri ex voluntariâ prævaricatione præsciti sunt.* Prosper. ad Gallorum cap. 3. edit. Basil. 1621.

God foresaw that they would fall by their own proper will, and for that very reason did not separate them by election from the sons of perdition. *Illos ruituros propriâ ipsorũ voluntate præscivit, & ob hoc à filiis Perditionis nullâ prædestinatione discrevit.* Id ibid. ad cap. 7.

God is the creator of all men, but no man was created to the end that he might perish. *Omnium quidem hominum Deus Creator est, sed nemo ab eo ideo creatus est ut pereat.* Idem ad object. Vinc. 3.

34. I have given the more *Testimonies* out of *Prosper*, because he is known to have been the *Scholar* and *vindicator* of *S. Austin*. And to produce *their suffrages*, is to imply all the rest. They having been the *only Antients* whom their contentions against *Pelagianism* made to speak sometimes to the great disadvantage of their opinion: as they do not stick to confesse themselves. And we ought in all reason to take *that* for their *Judgement*, which we find deliver'd by themselves by way of Apologie, and *vindication*. But though I need not, I will add some others.

He therefore brought the means of Recovery to all, that whosoever perisht might impute it to himself who would not be cur'd, when he had a Remedy whereby he might. *Ideo omnibus operas sanitatis detulit, ut quicunq; perierit, mortis suæ causam sibi ascribat, qui curari noluit, cùm remedium haberet quo posset evadere.* Ambros. l. 2. de Cain & Abel cap. 13.

Even

Etiam his qui mali sint futuri, datur potestas conversionis & pœnitentiæ.

Even they that shall be wicked have power given them of Conversion and Repentance. Hieron. l. 3. adversus Pelagianos.

Dilectio & odium Dei vel ex præscientiâ nascitur futurorum, vel ex operibus.

God's love and hatred arises from his præscience of things to come, or from the quality of mens works. Idem, ad Malach. 1.

Si dies æqualiter nascitur omnibus, quanto magis Christus? —Cum singuli ad donarium vocentur, quid est ut quod à Deo æqualiter distribuitur, humanâ interpretatione minuatur? Cyprian. Epist. 76.

If the day is equally born for all, how much rather is Jesus Christ? --- When every man is call'd to a participation of the gift, what is the reason, that what God hath equally distributed should by humane interpretation by any way lessend'?

* *Patet omnibus fons vitæ, neq; ab jure potandi quisquam prohibetur, aut pellitur.* Arnob. adversus Nat. l. 2.

* The fountain of life lies open to all. Nor is any man forbid or hindred from the right of Drinking.

Let Dr. *Twisse* himself be heard to speak in this matter, and that against *Piscator* (both *Antiarminians*) *Damnatio est Actus Judicis; & procedere debet secundum justitiam vindicativam: at ne vestigium quidem Justitiæ appareat in Damnatione Reproborum.* (He speaks of absolute irrespective Reprobation which *Piscator* set up) *Nam justitia neminem damnat nisi merentem. At esse reprobum, nequaquam significat mereri Damnationem. Sola Damnatio peccatoris splendere facit Dei Justitiam.* Twissus in vind. Gr. de Præd. l. 1. Digr. 1. §. 4. p. 57.

35. *Time* and *paper* will fail *me*, and *sufficient Patience* would fail my *Reader*, if I should make repetition of all I finde to my purpose. For whatsoever hath been spoken by the *Fathers*, of *universal Redemption*, doth Diametrically oppose the *irrespective Reprobation*. And to reckon up their *verdicts* in that behalf, were to ingage my

my *self* and *Reader* in a new *Ocean* of *employment*. I hope the account that I have given of my *belief* in this matter is a sufficient *Apologie* for my *belief*, and may at least *excuse* if not *commend* me. Rather then offend any man who takes me *upon Trust* to be *unsound* in my *principles*, I have made this *excuse* for being *orthodox* and do humbly desire to be *forgiven*, if I still adhære to *that Doctrine*, which by *Scripture*, and *Reason*, and the Authority of my *Teachers*, I am verily perswaded is the *truest* and the most *safe*: (to wit,)

The sum of all that hath been said.

1. That *man* himself is the *Cause* of his *sin*.
2. That *sin* is properly the *Cause* of its *punishment*.

And by consequence,

3. That *man* is the *procurer* of his own Misery.

And by consequence,

4. That *Reprobation* is a *Conditional* thing.

Not decreed by God Almighty to shew his *absolute power*, but to shew his *power* in the *exercise* of his *Justice*. Not Determin'd *before*, but *because* of his præscience. Nor *without regard or respect*, but in *Relation to sin, in foresight*, and *hatred*, and *Recompence* of it, as of an *injury*; on which *Damnation* is *præordain'd*, by way of *Recompence* and *Revenge*. And therefore the last day is call'd a *day of Judgement*, as well as of *perdition*. And the Judge himself is called, the *Lord God of Recompence*. And when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed in flaming fire, it shall be to take *vengeance* on them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Now that which is *the motive* to the *taking of vengeance*, was also the *motive* to the *making of the Decree*. He who *therefore takes vengeance, because they obey not the Gospel of Christ*, did for the very same *Reason, Decree to take it*.

2 Pet. 3. 7. Jer. 51. 56. 2 Thess. 1. 8.

Which

An obvious expedient to reconcile dissenters.

Which to me is *Demonstration* that the *Decree* is *Conditional.*

36. I have nothing now of *Duty* that lies upon me to be don, but that I descend to the *second ground* of my *Belief.* But for the love of *Charity* and *Reconcilement*, I will endevour to take a Course of making some *Composition* with my *Dissenters.* If they will but come up to my most *Reasonable Demands*, we will not strive about *words* and *phrases*; so small a thing shall *never part us.* I will *swallow* the word [*Necessity*,] so I may take it down with a *grain of salt.* I will say with Dr. *Whitaker* (in his 4. *Article* at *Lambeth*) *That they who are not prædestin'd to salvation shall be necessarily Damn'd* (but) *for their sins.* (as he himself speaks.) I allow my self to be *no wiser* then *Bishop Andrews*, (the *strings* of whose *books* I am not worthy to *untie*) who interprets *Necessariò*, not by an *absolute Necessity*, but by a *Necessity which follwes sin.* They shall be damn'd *for their sins*; that is, *for that very Reason, because they have sin'd*, not for that *only* Reason, *because they are not prædestin'd.* And because that *Reverend*, (I know not whether more *learned*, or *Saint like*) *Man*, allow'd himself to be no wiser then all the *Fathers and Schoolmen* who went before him, he thought 'twas fit to abstain from [such *καινοφωνίαι*] such *new phrases*, and waies, of *holding forth*, and *making out*, the *Ancient Doctrines* of the Church; and therefore in stead of [*necessity*] to say [*without Doubt.*] And for my own part, I desire to be *no deeper*, and to speak *no better language*, then all the *Fathers of the Church* (who have gon to *Heaven* with those *opinions*, for which I am *Censur'd* by *some* to *Hell*,) I choose to say [a *Conditional*, not an *absolute Necessity.*]

Qui non sunt prædestinati ad salutem, necessario propter peccata condemnabuntur. Art. Lamb. 4.

Atq; id necessariò (si sic loqui placeat) *sed* necessitate ex hypothesi, non Absolutâ. *Id est, ideo* quia peccarunt, *non autem* ideo, *quia non sunt prædestinati.* Epist. Wint. Jud. de art. Lamb.

37. If I may guesse (without censure) at the *Cause* of other mens *mistakes*, by that which once was mine *own*, I shall ascribe much of it to the vulgar *misconception* of Gods *præscience* or *foresight*. Which being *constant* and *infallible*, seems to give a *necessity* to all *events*, which are the objects of that *præscience*. And this must certainly be the reason, (I at least *must so conjecture* who can think of no *better*, and did my self *once stumble* upon this very *stone*) why Mr. *Calvin* will have Gods *præscience* to succeed his *præordination*. The *ground* of which *error* does so border upon *Truth*, as to lessen the wonder why men of *good parts* should so frequently *mistake* it, for that very truth, on which it *borders*. (And does unluckily verefie the *Italian Proverb*, *Troppo confina la verità col vitio.*) Gods *præscience* indeed does *imply* a *necessity*, which 'tis mistaken to have *effected*. And again the word *necessity* is not by every body *distinguisht*, as by the *Admirable Boethius*: (to whom I owe my greatest *light* in this particular.) For if it were, I beleeve many others might be *converted*, as I have *been*. But before I speak of the *Distinction*, I shall choose to say something in *preparation* to it. 'Tis briefly this.

The probable cause of the Dissention is a mistake of Gods præscience.

38. That the *knowledge* of the *Eternal* far transcending all *motion* and succession of *time*, does abide in the *simplicity* of its *present* being; beholding all *past* and *future* things in his *simple knowledge*, as *just now* done. And therefore *Boethius* will have it call'd not *Præscience*, but *Science*. Not *Prævidence*, but *Providence*: which doth not change the *natures* and *proprieties* of things *future*, but considers them as they *are*, in *respect of himself*; which is as they *shall be*, in *respect of Time*. For as the *knowledge* of things *present* doth import no *Necessity*

The mistake endeavour'd to be rectified.

Is. 41.22.23. Act. 15.18. Ps. 139.2.

Boethius de consol. Philosoph. lib. 5.

on that which *is done*; so the *fore knowledge* of *things future* layes no *necessity* on that which *shall be*: because whosoever either *knowes* or *sees* things, he *knows* and sees them as *they are*, and not as they *are not*. Gods knowledge doth not *confound* things, but reaches to all *events*, not only *Which* come to passe, but as they come to passe: whether *contingently*, or *necessarily*. As (for illustration) when I see a *man walk* upon the *earth*, and at the very same instant, the *Sun shining* in the *Heavens*, I see the first as *voluntary*, and the second as *natural*. And though at the instant that I see *both done*, there is a *necessity* that they *be done* (or else I could not see them when I do) yet there was a necessity of *one only*, before they were done, (viz. the *Suns shining in the Heavens*) but none at all of the *other*, (viz. the *mans walking upon the earth*.) The Sun could not *but shine*, as being a *natural agent*; The man might *not have walked*, as being a *voluntary* one. And hence it followes.

By the consideration of a twofold necessity in events.

39. There is a *twofold necessity*. Whereof one is absolute and the other on *Supposition*. The *Absolute* is that, by which a thing *must* be *moved* when something *moves it*. The *Suppositive* is that, by which a man shall be *damn'd* if he die *Impenitent*. The *latter necessity* (though not the *first*) does mightily well consist both with the *liberty of man's will*, and God's *Conditionall Decrees*. As for example. I am *now writing*, and God foresaw that I am writing, yet it does not follow that I *must needs write*; for I can choose. What God foresees *must necessarily* come to passe, but it must come to passe *in the same manner that he foresees it*. He foresees I will write, not of *necessity*, but *choice*; so that his *foresight* doth not *make* an *absolute Necessity*, but *infers* a *Necessity* upon *Supposition*. (Wee must

Duæ sunt necessitates. Simplex una, veluti quòd necesse est omnes homines esse mortales. Altera conditionis, ut si aliquem ambulare scias, cum ambulare necesse est. Boeth. de con. Phil. l. 5.

muſt mark, in a *Parenthesis*, how great a difference there is, betwixt the *making*, and the *inferring* of a Neceſſity.) Whatſoever I do, there is an *Abſolute Neceſſity* that God ſhould *foreſee*; yet God foreſeeing my *voluntary Action*, does not make it *neceſſary*, but on *ſuppoſition* that it is *don*. If all things are *preſent* to God, (as indeed they are) *his foreſight* muſt needs be all one with *our ſight*. As therefore when I ſee a man *daunce as he pleaſes*, it is *neceſſary* that he *do* what I *ſee* he *does*; but yet my *looking on* does not *make* the thing *neceſſary*; So Gods *foreſeeing* that man *would ſin*, implyed a *certainty* that ſo it would be, but did not make it an *abſolutely neceſſary* or *involuntary* thing. For that a thing may be *certain* (in reſpect of its *event*) and yet *not neceſſary* (in reſpect of its *cauſe*) is no newes at all to a conſidering perſon, who will but duly diſtinguiſh Gods *Omniſcience* from his *Omnipotence*, and his *Foreſight* from his *Decree*, and *infallible* from *neceſſary*, and *ſpontaneous* from *voluntary*, and that which *follow's* as a *Conſequence only*, from that which *follow's* as a *conſequent*. If I may judge by thoſe *errors* which I convince my ſelf to have been in, when I was contrary minded to what I am, I ſee as many *miſtakes* in other men ariſing from the *misfortune* of *confounding* thoſe things which I juſt now *diſtinguiſht*, as from any one *unhappineſſe* that I can think of. And from all that I have ſpoken upon this laſt ſubject, it ſeems inevitably to follow, that a *ſuppoſitive Neceſſity*, and *none elſe*, is conſiſtent with a *free and contingent Action*. Whilſt *I ſee* a man *ſitting*, it is *neceſſary* that he *ſit*, but upon *ſuppoſition* that *I ſee* him *ſitting*. His *poſture* is ſtill a voluntary *contingent* thing. For he *ſate down* when he *would*, and may *ariſe* when he *pleaſeth*. (but ſtill with a *proviſo*

of God's *Permission.*) I desire to be taught what *is*, if this is not, *exact speaking*, viz. That God by his *prohibition* under *penalty*, makes my *Disobedience* become liable to *punishment*. And by his *Decree* to *permit*, or *not hinder* me, he *leaves me in the hand of mine own counsel*, and so in the state of *peccability*, that I may *sin*, and *perish*, if *I will*. So that by his *præscience* that *I will sin*, he hath no manner of *influence* or *causality* upon my *sin*; which inferrs my *destruction* to be entirely from *myself*. I am a little confident, that whosoever shall but read *Boethius* his *fifth book*, and reading shall *understand* it, and understanding shall have the *modesty* to *retract* an *error*, he will not reverence the 4. *Section* of the 23. *Chapter* of the 3. *book* of *Institutions*, because it is Mr. *Calvins*, but will *suspect* Mr. *Calvin* because of that *Section*. The Question there is, [*Whether Reprobates were prædestin'd to that corruption which is the cause of Damnation*] To which he answers with a [*Fateor*] *I confesse that all the sons of Adam, by the expresse will of God, fell down into the misery of that condition, in which they are fetter'd and intangled.* And a little after he professeth, that no accompt can be given, but by *having recourse to the sole will of God, the cause of which lies hidden within it self.* And that we may not think he speaks only of the *posterity* of *Adam*, he tells us plainly in the *close* of that *Section*, *that no other cause can be given for the defection of Angels*, then that God did *reprobate* and *reject* them. In this place I would aske, Was the Angels *Defection* or *Apostasie* their *sin*, or *not*? If not, why were they *reprobated* and *cast* into *chaines* of *darkness*? and if it were, how then is *God's Reprobation* not only the *chief*, but the *only Cause* of *such a sin*? This is the *sad effect* of being *enslaved* to an *opinion*, and of being *ashamed* of

Eccius. 15. 14.

that liberty which looks like *being conquer'd*. I beleeve the *love of victory* hath been the cause of as many *mischiefs*, as have been feign'd to leap forth from *Pandora's Box*. Whereas if every one that *writes*, would but think it a noble and an *honourable* thing, to *lead* his own *pride captive*, to triumph over his own *conceitednesse*, and to pursue the *glory* of a *well natur'd submission*; there is perhaps hardly an *Author* of any considerable *length*, but might think he had reason to write a *book* of *Retractations*. And sure it will not be immodesty for a *young* man to say, That many *old men* might have don it, with as much reason as *S. Austin.* do. But as I have learnt of *Boethius* (that most excellent *Christian*, as well as *Senator*; & *profound Divine*, as well as *philosopher*, who lived a *Terror* to *Heresie*, and died a *Martyr* for the *Truth*) to distinguish of *Necessity*; so have I learn't from other *Antients*, to distinguish better of God's *will*, then I was wont to do. First, I distinguish (with *S. Chrysostome*) of a *first* and *second* will. Gods *first will* is, that *the sinner should not die*, but *return rather from his wickednesse* and *live*. His *second will* is, that he who *refuseth to return* receive the *wages of iniquity*. Secondly, I distinguish (with *Damascene*) of an *antecedent* and a *consequent will*. The *antecedent* is that, by which he wils that *every sinner should repent*. His *consequent* is that, by which he *preordaineth* the *Damnation* of the *impenitent*. Which distinction is not made in respect of Gods *will simply* (in which there cannot be either *prius* or *posterius*) but in respect of the things which are the *object* of his *will*. For every thing is *willed* by God so far forth as it is *good*. Now a thing *consider'd absolutely* may be *good* or *evill*, which in a *comparative consideration* may be the contrary as for example. *To save the life of a man*,

And by a right Application of a twofold Will in the Almighty.

Chrysost. in Epist. ad Eph. c. 1. Homil. 1.

Damascen. l. 2. Orth. Fid. c. 29.

is

is *good*; and to *destroy a man*, is *evil*, in a *first* and *absolute consideration*. But if a man secondly be *compar'd* with his having been a *murderer*, then to *save* his life, is *evil*; and to *destroy* it, *good*. From whence it may be said of a *just Judge*, that by his *antecedent will*, he *desires* every man should *live*; but by a *consequent will*, *decrees* the *death* of the *Murderer*. And even then, he doth so distinguish the *murderer* from the *man*, that he wisheth the *man* were *not a murderer*. Whom he condemns as *murderer*, and not as *man*. For whilst he hath a *will* to *hang* the *murderer*, he hath a merciful *woulding* to *save* the *man*. He doth not *hang* the *man*, but only because he is a *murderer*. And (if it lay in his power) he would *destroy* the *murderer*, to *save* the *man*. Both the one, and the other, is not an *absolute*, but a *conditional will*. He *would* save the man, (with an) [if] he were not a murderer. And *doth destroy* the *murderer*, (with a) *because* he is a *Malefactor*. Just so, God's *antecedent will* is, that every man *would repent* that he may *not perish*. It is his *consequent will*, that every one may *perish* who will *not repent*. Both the one and the other is *respective* and *conditional*. Thirdly, I distinguish (with *Prosper*) of an *inviting*, and *revenging will*. The *inviting* will is that, by which *all* are bidden to the *Wedding Feast*; his *revenging* will is that, by which he punisheth those that *will not come*. Or fourthly, I distinguish (with reverend *Anselme*) of the *will* of *God's mercy*, and of the *will* of his *Justice*. It is the *will* of his *Mercy*, that Christ should die for the sins of all; but 'tis the *will* of his *Justice*, that *all* should perish who *come not in* when they are *call'd*, or who only *so* come, as not to *continue*, and *persevere unto the end*.

Prosper. in Respon. ad objec. Vincen. sub finem.

Anselmus in Mat. cap. 6.

41. All

41. All theſe *Diſtinctions* come to *one* and the *ſame purpoſe*, and being *rightly underſtood*, as well as *dexterouſly uſed*, do ſeem to me a *Gladius Delphicus*, ſufficient to *cut a ſunder* the chiefeſt *knots* in this Queſtion. For the *firſt* will of God may be *repealed*, whereas the *ſecond immutable*. Which is the ground of that Diſtinction betwixt the *Threats* and *Promiſes* under God's *Oath*, and thoſe other under his *Word* only. Of which ſaith the *Councel* of *Toledo*, *Jurare Dei eſt, à ſeipſo ordinata, nullatenus convellere. Pœnitere verò, eadem ordinata, cùm voluerit, immutare.* *When* he is reſolv'd to *execute* his *purpoſe*, he is ſaid to *ſwear*; and when it *pleaſeth* him to *alter it*, he is ſaid to *repent*. For there are ſome Decrees of God which (being conditional) do *never come to paſſe*; as he *thought* to have done an *Evil of puniſhment* unto Iſrael, which yet he *did not*. *Exod.* 32. 14. And the reaſon of this is given us from that *diſtinction* before mention'd. Which alſo ſerveth to *reconcile* many *ſeeming repugnances* in *Scripture*. For when it is ſaid, that *God repenteth* (1 *Sam.* 16. 29.) it is meant of the *firſt will*; and when it is ſaid *he cannot repent* (1 *Sam.* 16. 29,) it is meant of the *ſecond*. In reſpect of the *firſt*, we are ſaid to *grieve*, to *quench*, to *reſiſt* the Spirit of God, (1 *Theſ.* 5. 19.) but when it is ſaid, *who hath reſiſted his will?* (*Rom.* 9. 19.) it is meant of the *ſecond*. God's *Mercy* is *above* and *before* his *Juſtice*, and therefore that is his *firſt will*, that *all ſhould be ſav'd and come to the knowledge of the Truth* (1 *Tim.* 2. 4.) but yet ſo as that *Juſtice* is not *excluded* by his *Mercy*, and therefore that is his *ſecond Will*, that *ſo many ſhould be damn'd as hated knowledge, and did not chooſe the fear of the Lord.* (*Prov.* 1. 29.) The will of his *Mercy*, *that all ſhould*

Concil. Toletan. 8. c. 1.

should live, is from nothing but his *goodnesse*; whereas the will of his *Justice*, *that some should die*, *depends* upon something in the *Creature*. (So that *both parties* may be gratified, they that are for the *dependence*, and *the independency* of his *Will*.) That the Reprobate is *invited*, is from the *mercy* of *God*'s Will; but that he is *punish'd* for *not accepting*, is from the *obliquity* of his *own*. In respect of the *first*, it *is the man* that *refuseth God* (*Jer.* 8. 5.) But in respect of the *second*, it is *God* that doth *reprobate man*. (*Rom.* 1. 28.) The *free Love* of the *Creator* is the *only motive* to his *first will*; but man's *ingratitude* and *rebellion* is his *impellent* to the *second*. The *first* shewes him a *tender* and *compassionate Father*; the *second* speaks him a *righteous* and an *impartial Judge*. *Both* proclaim him a *powerful and a provident God*. Now can any *Distinction* be better *chosen*, can any *word* that is *æquivocal* be more *safely understood*, can any *Opinion* (of *God*'s will, or *mans*) be more *rationally*, more *warily*, or more *religiously* entertain'd, then *that* wherein God's *Mercy* doth *greet* his *Justice*? and wherein his *Love* doth *kisse* his *Power*? I *appeal* to any man living, whether this be an *Error*, or if it is, whether it is not a very *safe one*; and if it is so, whether it is not a very *small* one; and if so *safe*, that none can *suffer* by it; if so *small*, that no body can *see it*; whether the *Author* of this *Appeal* is not very *excusable*, both for not being able to *see* his *own Eyes*, nor to *see* his *own Error* with other *mens*. As much as in me lies, *I would live peaceably with all men*. With those especially, who *when I speak unto them thereof*, *make them ready to battle*. And in order to that *Peace*, I desire them to lay this one thing to heart. That as, if I were as *they*, I would *quit my Opinion*; so, if *they* were as I, they would not long *keep their own*.

Rom. 12.18.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Free and special Grace defended against the Pelagians and Massilians in the second Principle proposed.

42. HAving proved hitherto, that *Sin* is really the *cause* of *Punishment*, that *Man* is really the *cause* of *Sin*, and therefore that *Man* is the *grand cause* of *Punishment*, (as being the *cause* of the *cause* of his *Damnation*) intending thereby to *secure* my self against the errors and blacker guilt of the *Manichees*, the *Marcionites*, the *Stoicks*, and the *Turks*, who do all affirm (some *directly*, some by *necessary consequence*) That *God's absolute Will* is the *cause* of *sin*, and *man's* only the *instrument*; the *second part* of my *Task* is to be an *Advocate*, for the *pleading* and asserting the *Cause* of *God* too; and that against the *Opiners* of the *other Extreme*, to wit, the *Pelagians* and the *Massilienses*; who, to be *liberal* to *Nature*, do *take away* from *Grace*; and to *strengthen* the *Handmaid*, do *lessen* the *forces* of the *Mistresse*. And though I think the *latter* to be the *milder Heresie* of the *two*, it being *lesse dangerous* to ascribe *too much goodnesse* to the *Power* of *Nature*, (which very power is undoubtedly the gift of God) then the very *least Evil* to the *God of all Grace*, (and this according to the Judgement of the *Synod* at *Orange*, which pronounced an *Anathema* upon the first *Heresie*, whereas it did but *civilly reject* the *second*) yet in a *perfect dislike* and *rejection* of this latter *Extremity*, as well as of the former, my *second Principle* is this.

The second Principle or Ground of my Belief in this businesse.

That *all* the *good* which I *do*, I do first *receive*; not from any thing in *myself*, but from the *special* Grace and *Favour* of *Almighty God*. Who freely *worketh in me*, both to *will*, and to *do*, of his *good pleasure*, Phil. 2. 13.

Explained.

43. That I may not be suspected of any *secret Reservation* within my self, in the laying down of this *Principle*; I will endevour to *speak out*, and make my *Reader* my *Confessor*, by revealing the very *utmost* of what I think in *this businesse*. *I believe*, that *no man* can come to *Heaven*, any otherwise then by *Christ*; nor to *Christ*, unlesse it be *given*; (that is, unlesse the *Father draw him*.) First the *Father* loves the *Son*; next he loves *us in* the *Son*; then *endowes* us with his *Spirit*; *so* endow'd he *elects* us; *so elected* he *prædestines* us; so *prædestin'd* he will *glorifie* us; by *crowning* his *Gifts* and *Graces in* us. I say *his Graces*, because they are not *acquir'd* by *us*, but *infus'd* by *him*. Not so properly *given*, as *lent* us. Lent us as *Talents*, not to *hide*, but *multiply*. Wee owe it wholly to God, not that he gives us his *Grace* only, but that he gives us the *grace* to *desire* his *Grace*, as well as to use it to the advancement of his Glory. And we are to *thank* him, as for all other mercies, so for this also, *even that we have the Grace to thank him*. So far am I from that *Pelagianism* whereof I have *wrongfully* been *accus'd*, (I beseech God not *to lay it to my Accusers charge*) that I have never lain under any the least *Temptation* to any *degree* of that *Heresie*. No, no more, then *Fulgentius*, or *Prosper*, or S. *Austin himself*. It not only *is*, but *ever hath been* my *assertion*, That as we cannot *spiritually* be *nourished*, unlesse the *Father of Mercies* doth *reach out unto us the Bread of Heaven*; and as we cannot

take

Act. 4. 12. Joh. 6. 44. 65.

take it when it is *offered*, unleſſe he *gives* us the *hand* of *Faith*; ſo cannot we poſſibly *deſire* to take it, unleſſe he gives us our very *appetite* and *hunger*. We cannot *pant* after the *waters of life*, unleſſe he gives us our very *thirſt*. He *ſtirs us up*, when we are *ſleeping*, that we may *ſeek him*; and *ſhews* himſelf, when we are *ſeeking*, that we may *find him*; and gives us *ſtrength*, when we have *found* him, that we may *hold him faſt unto the end*. There is no *good thought* ariſing in us, unleſſe ſuggeſted by his (a) *preventing* Grace. No, nor *increaſing*, unleſſe *ſtrengthned* by his (b) *ſubſequent* Grace. No nor *conſummate*, unleſſe (c) *perfected* by his Grace of *perſeverance*. If I am *better* then *any man*, it is God that *makes* me (d) *differ*. *Every good gift is from above, and cometh down from the father of lights*. And therefore *he that will glory, let him glory in the Lord*, ſaying with the Pſalmiſt, *Not unto us O Lord, not unto us, but unto thy name give the praiſe*.

44. Having thus *ſecur'd* my ſelf from giving the *Will* of *Man* a *ſacrilegious Liberty*; I muſt with all provide, that I be able to *anſwer* the *Objection* of the *Marcionites*; which *Tertullian* could not do, but by *aſſerting* the *liberty* of the *Will*. Which *Grace* doth *correct*, but not *deſtroy*. Grace doth *ſtrengthen*, but not *compell*. Grace doth *guide*, but not *neceſſitate*. Grace *makes able* to *chooſe good*, but not *unable* to *refuſe it*. *Marcion* objected thus. *If* God *is good, and præſcient of all the Evill which is to come, and withal able to prevent it, why did he ſuffer mankind to fall?* why did he not *hold him faſt* by *irreſiſtible* Grace? *Tertullian* anſwer'd, *That God made man in his own Image*, and that in nothing more *lively* then in the *liberty of a Will*. *And to that it is, to which his fall muſt*

a Phil. 1. 6. & 2. 13. Heb. 12. 2.
b Luke 19. 13. 26.
c 1 Cor. 15. 10.
d 1 Cor. 4. 7. Jam. 1. 17. 1 Cor. 1. 31. Pſal. 115. 1.

Reconciled with Choice, which is *irreconcilable* with *Irreſiſtibility*.

Object. 1. *Si Deus bonus & præſcius mali, & potens depellere, cur hominem labi paſſus eſt? Reſp. liberum & ſui arbitrii & ſuæ poteſtatis invenio hominem.* & ſeqq.

Object. 2. *Homo ita debuit institui, ut non posset cadere. Resp. Ergo bonum suum haberet emancipatum sibi à Deo. Et bonus aut malus necessitate fuisset inventus, non voluntate. Nec boni nec mali merces jure pensaretur ei.* Tertull. adverſ. Marc. l. 2. c. 5. 6.

1. *Proved by Scripture.* Phil. 2. 12, 13.

be imputed. But (ſaith *Marcion*) *Man ought* to have been made of *ſuch a frame*, as *not to be able to fall away.* Yea but then (ſaith *Tertullian*) *Man* had not been a *voluntary*, but a *neceſſary Agent.* (which is as much as to ſay, *a Man ſhould not have been a Man.*) *Nor could have been a right object of Reward and Puniſhment.*

45. Before I venture on any *rational*, or *Scholaſtical* way of *arguing*, I muſt firſt *enlighten* my ſelf out of ſome *clear* places of *Scripture.* Amongſt which there is none that ſeems more proper, then that of S. *Paul* to the *Philippians. Work out your ſalvation with fear and trembling. For it is God which worketh in you, both to will, and to do, of his good pleaſure.* He bids *them work, becauſe God worketh*, which they needed not to have been bid to do, If God had *workt* after a *phyſical irreſiſtible* manner. That they might not be betray'd into a *yawning reliance* upon their being *ſuperacted* to the *working out* of their *ſalvation*, he bids them work it out with *fear and trembling.* (as our Saviour bids us, *Strive to enter in at the ſtrait Gate*, becauſe *many ſhall ſtrive*, and *ſhall not enter.*) which they needed not have don, had their ſalvation been (not only a *certain*, but withall) *a neceſſary, unavoidable thing*, and ſo inconſiſtent with *choice* and *option.* But the Apoſtle tels them (in the *next verſe*) that it is *God* who worketh in them, not *only to do*, but to *will*, and to *do*; by his *preventing Grace*, he worketh in them to *will*; by *aſſiſting Grace*, he worketh in them *to do*: by neither ſo *irreſiſtibly*, but that they muſt *work it out Themſelves too*; and that not only with *expectation* and *hope*, but with *fear* and *trembling.* God *worketh in us* to *will* (ſaith the *Apoſtle*) not *without*, or *againſt*, but *according to* the *nature* of that very *will* with which he *made us.* *Grace* doth

not

not *deſtroy*, but *eſtabliſh*, and *ſtrengthen*, and *perfect Nature*. Shall we ſay that we do a thing *without liberty* and *choice*, becauſe God *worketh in us* to *will* and *to do*? (that is) to do it by *choice* and *option*? is the liberty *loſt*, becauſe it is *guided* and *enabled* to do that which is good? if I *can do all things through Chriſt that ſtrengthens me*, then can I (*through him*) both *refuſe* the *evil*, and *chooſe* the *Good*. Which would not be *choice*, if it were *whether I would or no*. And *ſo* it would be, were I *unable* to *reſiſt it*. (as I ſhall ſhew by and by in the open confeſſion of D. *Twiſſe*, whoſe *Favourers* cannot be angry with one that ſpeaks in his language.) *I can do all things through him that ſtrengthens me*, (ſaith the *Apoſtle*) now *to ſtrengthen*, is not to *neceſſitate*. For then *to ſtrengthen*, would be *to weaken*. Becauſe to *neceſſitate*, or *compel*, with an *irreſiſtibility*, is to *vanquiſh*, and *over-maſter*; not to *give ſtrength*, but rather to *take it away*. Again, our Saviour is ſaid *to tread down Satan under our feet*. To what end doth he *tread* the *Serpent down*, but that we may have the *freedom* to *trample on him*? and though he doth it *with his own feet*, yet it is *under ours*. This *liberty* and *freedom* of the *regenerate will*, is at once *expreſſed* and *expounded* in thoſe words of the *Pſalmiſt*, *I will run the way of thy Commandments, when thou ſhalt ſet my heart at liberty*. To which is agreeable that of our *Saviour*, *and the truth ſhall make it free*. It being a great *abſurdity* (in the opinion of *Tertullian*) *that a man ſhould have his happineſſe forced on him by God Almighty*. So far is God from *proſtituting* his *Bleſſing*, by ſuch a *controlling* of the *will*, and ſuch an *obtruding* of the *object*, as makes the *object unavoidable*, that he doth not only *offer* and *propoſe* it to his peoples *choice*, but *deſires* them alſo *to chooſe it*. *I call heaven*

Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus. Nec ad virtutes nec ad vitia neceſſitate trahimur. Alioqui ubi neceſſitas, ibi nec damnatio, nec corona eſt. Hieron. contra Jovinian. l. 2.

Valet liberum arbitrium ad bona, ſi divinitus adjuvetur; quod ſit, humiliter petendo & faciendo. Auguſt. epiſt. 89. Pſal. 119 32.

Joh. 8. 32. Tertull. loco citato. 2 Cor. 5. 20. Deut. 30. 15. 19.

Josh. 24. 16.

heaven and earth to record this day against you (saith God by *Moses*) *that I have set before you Life and Death, blessing and cursing. Therefore choose life, that thou and thy seed may live.* But *choose* we *cannot*, if God works in us *irresistibly*; as I will farther prove by *Reason*.

2. *Proved by Reason.* *Illud propriè dicitur irresistibile, cui resistere nemo potest, quamvis velle.* Twiss. in præf. ad vin. Grat. §. 9. p. 31.

46. * That is properly called *irresistible*, which is of such an *over-ruling* and *prevailing force*, that a man *cannot withstand* it, although he *would*. (And thus Dr. *Twisse* hath well *defin'd* it) from whence it followes, that to *choose irresistibly*, is a *contradiction* in *Adjecto*. For it is to *will a thing* whether *one will or no*. He that saith, God *worketh* in us to *choose irresistibly*, doth say in effect, He *so worketh* in us, as that we *cannot choose but choose*. Which is as much as to say, not only *that we do, what we cannot do*, but that we *therefore do it, because we cannot do it*. He that cannot *choose but chose*, doth choose *because* he cannot choose. Which is as bad as to say, that the thing is *necessary, because* it is *impossible*. To make this plain to my *plainest Reader*, I will shew the *legality* of my *deduction* by these degrees. First, he that is *wrought upon* by God (to *believe, obey*, or *persevere*) *irresistibly, cannot possibly* do *otherwise* (then *beleeve, obey*, or *persevere*.) Secondly, he that *cannot possibly* do *otherwise* then he *doth, cannot possibly choose* but *do* what he *doth*. Thirdly, he that *cannot choose* but *do* what he *doth*, doth clearly *do* it *whether he will or no*. Fourthly, he that doth *beleeve, obey*, or *persevere, whether he will or no*, doth do it by as *evident undeniable Necessity*, as *that* by which *a stone tends downwards*. (Which *tendency* of the *stone*, though it is *spontaneous*, yet is not *voluntary*, and as it is not by *violence*, so neither is it by *choice*.) Fifthly, he that *willeth* to *beleeve, obey*, or *persevere, whether he will or no*, doth do

do it by a *Necessity*, by which a *stone tends upwards*, when it is *thrown*, (Which *tendency* of the *stone* is so far from *voluntary*, that it is not *spontaneous*. It is not only an *irrational*, but an *unnatural* thing.) and besides implies a *contradiction* in a *voluntary Agent*, which cannot take place in an *involuntary stone*. For to say, a man *willeth* to *obey* or *beleeve*, *whether he will or no*, is to say he *willeth* it either *without* his *will*, or *against* his *will*, or else *not having a will at all*. Which is as bad as to say, that he *must needs will it* because he *cannot any way possible*. I know not any trick imaginable for the escaping the *odium* of these *Absurdities*, unless by denying the *definition* of *irresistible*. Which were not to *escape*, but to *commute* absurdities. And not only the *authority* of Dr. *Twisse*, but the very *force* of the *word* would *cry it down*. And so little is my *deduction* in a *capacity* to be blam'd, that Doctor *Twisse* saith expresly of *irresistibility*, *It hath no place in the act of willing*. And though he pleads for a *Necessity*, which he will have to follow Gods *operation* upon the *Soul*, yet he will have that *Necessity* to be *no other*, then what may very well *agree* with the *liberty of the will*. So that if that learned *Doctor*, in that his *skirmish* with *Arminius*, had not *confounded* a *necessity*, with a *certainty* of event, and used *that* word in stead of *this*, his *Antagonist* and *He* (in that particular) must needs have *wrangled* into *Friendship*. For *Arminius* denieth the *irresistible working* of *Grace* upon the *Will*, and so doth Dr. *Twisse*. Again Dr. *Twisse* affirmeth, that the *liberty of the will* doth agree with the *working* of *Grace* upon the *Will*, and so doth *Arminius*. And therefore I hope for no *hard usage* from such as are *haters* of *Arminius*, whilst I say the *same things* with them that *hate him*.

In actu volendi locum non habet. In loco citato. *Ex hujusmodi autem operatione divinâ existit Necessitas effectus, cum ipsâ libertate voluntatis consentiens.* Ibid.

47. Me

The Ground of the oppoſite miſtake removed.

47. Me thinks the *principal Ground* of *my miſtakes heretofore* in this buſineſſe, (if I may be allow'd to paſſe a *conjecture* upon my *ſelf*) is the *miſapprehenſion* of certain Texts, the *cauſe* of whoſe *miſapprehenſion* is the *illogical confounding* of *two things*, which though they *look like one another*, are yet *exceedingly different*. As for *example* from [*Ezek. 26. 27. Cant. 1. 4. 1 Joh. 3. 9. I will cauſe you to walk in my Statutes*, &c. *Draw me, we will run after thee. Whoſoever is born of God cannot ſin, becauſe he is born of God*, and the like] many conclude that *Gods working* upon the *wils* of his *Elect*, is by ſuch a *phyſical immediate immutation* of their *wils*, as doth not only produce a *certain*, but a *neceſſary effect*. And being *forgetful* (rather then *ignorant*) to diſtinguiſh *neceſſity* from *certainty* of *events*, they call that *neceſſary*, which is but *certain*, and *infallible*, and ſo (through *haſt*, or *inadvertency*,) they ſwallow down the Error of *irreſiſtible Grace*; uſing the word *irreſiſtible* in ſtead of *effectual*. And this is a *ſecond Inadvertency* begotten of the *firſt*; as commonly *one error* loves to *draw on another*. Now becauſe a *fallacy* undiſcerned in the *præmiſes* cannot poſſibly be *diſcover'd* by *gazing* only on the *Concluſion*, (juſt as an *error* in the *firſt Concoction*, is hardly mended in the *ſecond*,) I muſt *mark out* the *difference* betwixt *infallible*, and *neceſſary*, Before I can *uſefully diſtinguiſh* betwixt *effectual*, and *irreſiſtible*.

By rightly diſtinguiſhing betwixt infallible and Neceſſary.

48. *Infallible* properly is that, that *cannot erre*, or be *deceived*. That is properly *Neceſſary*, which *cannot but be*. The *firſt* relates to the *perfection* of the *Knowledge* of God, but the *ſecond* to the *Almightineſſe* of his *will*. The *firſt* is properly applyed unto the object of God's *foreſight*, (and though 'tis otherwiſe uſed, yet 'tis by ſuch

such a *Catachresis*, as I humbly conceive to be a *stone of stumbling*,) But the *second* more *precisely* unto the object of his *Decree*. The *first* is *consistent* with those *contingent events*, to which the *second* is *Diametrically opposed*. As for example. That I am *now writing*, is but *contingent*, because I do it upon *choise*. Yet Gods *foreknowledge* of this my writing from all *Eternity* did infer that this my writing would *infallibly come to passe*. This *event* is *contingent*, for I can *choose*; but yet *infallible*, for God cannot *erre*. This *contingent* therefore doth *infallibly* come to passe, not by way of a *consequent*, but by way of *consequence*. My *writing* being not the *effect*, but the *object* only of God's *Omniscience*. Which is, in *point* of order, *before* the *Act*. God *foresees* a *contingent* will *contingently* come to passe, and therefore we infer it will *infallibly* come to passe, because *he foresees* it who is *infallible*. So that his *præscience* is a *Consequent* of the thing's coming to passe; and it's *infallibility* of coming to passe, is *inferr'd* from his *præscience*, only by way of *Consequence*. It is one thing, *to follow* as the *effect* of a *Cause*, in order of *Nature*; and quite another, to *follow* as the *sequel* of an *Antecedent*, in way of *Argumentation*. The *short* and *plain* upshot of all is this. The precious *vessels* of *Election* do very *certainly* and *infallibly* persevere unto the end, and that by reason of God's *omniscience* which cannot be *deceived*; but not of *necessity* and *irresistibly*, by reason of his *omnipotence* which cannot be *frustrated* or *defeated*. What God *foresees* shall come to passe, *shall infallibly* come to passe, and that because he cannot *erre*, who is *omniscient*. (On the other side) what God *decrees* shall come to passe, *must* come to passe of *necessity*, because he cannot be *resisted*, who is *omnipotent*.

Betwixt sufficient, effectuall, and unresistible.

49. Hence it is easie to *distinguish* betwixt the *other two or three things*, which have so *often*, and so *unhappily been confounded*; I mean *sufficient*, *effectual*, and *irresistible*, applyed to *Grace*. 1 *Sufficien. Grace* is that, which *possibly may* produce that *effect* for which it is given. 2 *Effectual* is that, which *certainly will*. 3 *Irresistible* is that, which *necessarily must*. That which is *irresistible* doth *carry away* its *object* to what it pleaseth, like a mighty *Torrent*, by *indisputable force*, maugre the *greatest opposition* that can be made, and therefore cannot take place in the *elections* of the *will*, which ceaseth to *elect* after the nature of a *will*, if it be made to do any thing *whether it will or no*. (as hath already been *shew'd* from no lesse a *concession* then that of Doctor *Twisse*.) But that which is *effectual only*, is quite another thing, and doth *prevail* upon the *will* not *ineluctably*, but *infallibly*. It doth so *strongly* and *effectually incline* the *will*, at such *critical opportunities*, and by such *congruous means*, as that the *will* doth very *certainly* and *undoubtedly assent*. But it doth not so *irresistibly* and *compulsively necessitate*, as to take away the *freedom* and *possibility* of *assenting*, by making it do what it doth, even *whether it will or no*.

Betwixt action in general, and volition in particular. Betwixt Taking and Choosing.

50. I *discern* the *Truth* of this *distinction* with greater *ease*, by having alwaies in my *prospect* the very great difference, betwixt the *generical* notion of *acting*, or *taking*, and the *specifical* notion of *willing*, or *choosing*. God indeed (if it please him) can by his *absolute power* over his *Creature*, make him *act* this thing, or *take* that thing, by *ineluctable Necessity*, and *whether he will or no*. But then that *acting* is not *volition*, and that *taking* is not *choise*. For the very word *choise* cannot be rightly *apprehended*, but it must carry along with it a *sound* of *freedom*. *Optio* must be

be *optimorum*, and so *duorum* at the least. It is of *two things* or *more*, that we *choose* the *best*, whether in *reality*, or in *appearance*. And this *liberty* of the *will*, by which we *choose*, being acknowledg'd on all sides, (as well by Mr. *Perkins*, and Dr. *Twisse*, as by *Bellarmine*, and *Arminius*, as every man knows who hath but *read* and *compar'd* them) that famous distinction of a *twofold Necessity*, the one of *coaction*, and the other of *infallibility*, (being built upon a *manifest* and *grosse mistake* both of the word *Necessity*, and the word *Infallibility*,) seems to me to be serviceable to no other end, then to *cover* a *wound*, which 'tis impossible to *cure*. But admit of that *distinction* of a *twofold Necessity*, or admit a *Necessity* be *twentifold*, yet still it ceaseth not to have the nature of a *Necessity*. If it is *absolutely Necessary* that I *must* go to *London*, it doth not cease to be *Necessity*, because I am *drawn*, rather then *driven*. *Coaction*, and *infallibility*, if they both imply an *absolute* and *peremptory Necessity*, (and so by consequence an *irresistibility*, and so by consequence are *opposed* to the *elective* faculty of the *Will*,) it is no matter how they differ in their *Syllables* and their *sounds*. Shall I declare my *Judgement* then, (although in *weakness*, yet in *sincerity*) how *freewill* is *necessary* to the *choosing* of *good*, to which, *without* Grace, it is *altogether insufficient*? My judgement is, that it is *necessary*, not as a *Cause*, but as a *Condition*. Not as that, *by vertue of which*, we can *do* any thing that is *good*; but as that, *without which*, we cannot *choose* it. God's *Grace* alone is the *cause* of the *good*, but *man's will* is as really the *instrument* of the *choise*. We can *do* good, as God's *Engines*, *without a will*; and so did *Balaams Asse*, without a *Reason*. But we cannot *choose* good, without a *freewill*, as that

Asse could not possibly *understand* what she *spake*, *without* a *Ratiocination*. This seems to me to be as *plain* as the *light*. And now I speak of the *light*, (if my *Reader* please) by that *light* I will make it *plain*. We know the Sun is the *fountain* or *Cause* of *light*. And *light* the only *means* by which we *see*. But yet the *opening* of the *Eye-lid* is a *necessary condition*; because if I *wink*, I am *dark* at *noon*. And if my *Eyelid* is *held open* by such a *power* as I cannot *resist*, my *Eye* in that case cannot *choose but see*, and therefore cannot *choose to see*. My sight may be with *delectation*, but not properly with that which is call'd *election*. Thus if any man be *delighted* in doing good, but (by reason of *Necessity*) cannot possibly *but do it*, it is God that *chooseth* that good, and the man doth only *act* it. I say *God chooseth*, by a *catachrestical* way of speaking, meerly the better to *shew* my *thoughts*. For though God did *choose* to *make a world*, and *one* world, because it was in his power to have made *many worlds*, or *none at all*; yet I conceive it *absurd*, to say that God did *choose* to be *good*, or that he *chooseth* to *do good*, (in opposition to *evil*) because he *is good*, and *doth good*, by an *absolute necessity*; he cannot *choose to be*, or *to do*, any *otherwise*. And so he *loves*, but does not *choose it*. For if that were *true speaking*, 'twould be as *true speaking* to say, that God doth *will* his *being* and *doing good*, *whether he will or no*; or that he *cannot choose but choose*. Which is sure very *childish untoward speaking*. Only he *chooseth* to *enable us* to *do* it, because he can *choose*, whether he *will* so *enable* us, or *no*. When he *giveth* us his *Grace*, he hath the *power* to *withhold* it; when he *continueth* his *Grace*, he hath the *power* to *withdraw* it; therefore doth he *choose* both to *give* and to *continue* it. The *goodness* of his *essence* is not

arbitrary

arbitrary and *elective*, but *ſpontaneous* and *natural*. Whereas the *goodneſſe* of his *effects* in all his *Creatures*, is not *naturally neceſſary* in reſpect of him, but *arbitrary* and *elective*, meerly depending upon his *pleaſure*. For he *gave* us our *goodneſſe when we would*, and may *take it away* when he *pleaſeth*. To *underſtand* this the *better*, and to *hold* it *faſt* in my *underſtanding*,

Betwixt *voluntary* and *ſpontaneous*.

51. I muſt carefully *diſtinguiſh*, betwixt *ſpontaneum*, (that which is *of its own accord*) and *voluntarium*, (that which is *freely* and upon *choiſe*.) The *firſt* is *agreeable* to *inanimate* creatures, the *ſecond* only to *rational*. *That* is properly *oppos'd* to *violence*, but *reconcilable* with *neceſſity*, to which *this* is *oppos'd*. As for example. A ſtone *tends downwards* by a *natural*, and *neceſſary*, and *ſpontaneous* motion. It tends downwards of *neceſſity*, becauſe it *cannot but do* ſo. And yet *ſpontaneouſly*, becauſe it doth it *without violence*, and *of its own accord*. But yet that motion is not *voluntary*, nor doth the *ſtone chooſe* that kind of *tendency*, becauſe it could not *refuſe* it, as not being furniſht with the *liberty* of a *will*. Thus when I made my entrance out of the *womb* into the *world*, I did not *chooſe* to go *forwards*, becauſe I had *not* the *power* to ſtay *behind*. I did it as a *ſpontaneous*, not as a *voluntary* Agent. But now that I am capable either of *virtue*, or of *vice*, and do *purſue* the *one*, in *refuſal* of the *other*, I do it not only in a *ſpontaneous*, but in a *voluntary* manner. We have the *perfect character* of a *voluntary Agent* in that admirable παράϕρασις of the *Son of Syrach*, *The Lord left man in the hand of his Counſel; if thou wilt, to keep the Commandments. He hath ſet fire and water before thee; ſtretch forth thy hand unto whether thou wilt. Before man is life and death, and whether him liketh ſhall be given him* I dare not

Eccleſiaſticus 15, 13, 14. 15. 16. 17.

not (like *Marcion*) be more inquisitive, why God made man with such a freedom of *willing* or *nilling*, then why he made the hand with those *two Muscles*, whereof the *one* doth move *to the taking* of a thing, and the *other*, to the *throwing of it away*.

A result of the whole in two Examples.

52. Having spoken all this in order to the clearing of *resistibility* in the *working* of *Grace* in God's *Elect*, I think I cannot do better, then to *apply* my present reasoning to *two examples*, (at least as much of it as shall be needfull) whereof one must be the *Protoplast*, *before* his *Fall*, and the other must be one of his *posterity*, whom we are very well assur'd to have been one of God's *Elect*. *Adam* was made in a state of *Innocence*, and (God not requiring any *Impossibilities*, as *brick* without *straw*,) had grace enough to have perform'd a most *adaquate obedience* to Gods *Command*. Which if he had *not resisted*, how could he possibly have *sin'd*? and if that *measure* of *Grace* was lessen'd, before he *sin'd*, how was the *taking away* of *Grace* any *punishment* of his *Fall*? or how was he then in the *state* of *Innocence*? If he was not, then was he *sinful*, *before* he *sin'd*. God does not *take away* his *Grace*, unlesse to *punish* the *abuse* of it. But *Adam* did not *abuse* it, before he *sin'd*; and by our *Saviour's* Rule [*To him that hath shall be given*) God would rather have given him *more*, then have taken away *any*. From whence it followes, that though the *working* of *Grace* in the *heart* of *Adam*, was so *strong*, and so *perfect*, as to *enable* him to *stand*, and that in no lesse then a state of *Innocence*, yet was it also so *resistible*, as to suffer him to *fall*, and that into no lesse then a state of *Perdition*. And although he had the favour to be *rais'd* again in *some measure*, yet it was not to that *Innocence* from whence he *fell*. So that

Mat. 25. 28.

as

as to his *first Covenant*, and his first *pitch* of *perfection*, his *Fall* was not only *total*, but *final* too. And indeed I would know, why our *Saviour* hath told us, that *from him that hath not, shall be taken away even that which he hath*, if it is not for this reason, *because he hath lavisht out his talent*, and hath *resisted* that *power* of doing well which was *offer'd* him. There is no better arguing, then *ab actu ad potentiam*. Man *can resist*, because he *doth*. And I may wonder, as well as *Grotius*, why such men are not *confuted* by their own manifold *experience*, who say that *Grace* in the *Elect* is *unresistible*, unless they will deny Themselves to be of the *number* of the *Elect*. *David* had *Grace* to have done *better* then he did, in the *double* matter of *Vriah*; but he *resisted* it with a *witnesse*, and that for *some months together*. He was a *vessel* of *election*; how then did he *resist* the *Grace* of God, so as to *fall* into those *damnable* and *killing sins*, in which, if he had *dyed*, he had *perish'd irreversibly*? it was not *without Grace*, (for he was one of the *Elect*,) nor by its *concurrence*, (for God was not *guilty*,) it was therefore *against* the *working* and *means* of *Grace*. Indeed if God did his *utmost*, such as *David* could *never sin*. Or if they could, it would argue *God conquer'd*, by *man*, or *Devil*. Unless we should say, that such *omnipotent Grace* doth *come*, and *go*, and *come* again, after the measure that God is willing, a man should *sin*, and *repent*, and *sin again*. And therefore it is evident, that God Almighty, in his *Elect*, doth shew only the *congruous and the efficacious Power*; not the *irresistibility*, and *Almightinesse* of his *Grace*. Sure *David* (and *Solomon*) did *fall* from *Grace*, by *resisting it*, in both acceptions of the word *Grace*; as it is taken for *gracious* living, and as it is taken for the *favour of* God,)

God,) and this is *invincibly concluſible* even from that very *anſwer*, which is wont to be *alledged* for *irreſiſtibility*. For they ſay, God had *decreed* the *Repentance* and *new life* of *David*, and therefore he could *not die*, till he had *repented*. Which is ſpoken by them for *this reaſon*, becauſe if *David* had *not repented*, he muſt have *periſht*. Which yet he could not have don, if he had really *continued* in the *ſtate* of *Grace*.

And that cleared from an exception.

53. If againſt this it is excepted, That though a *veſſel of Election* may *fall damnably from Grace*, yet he cannot *finally*, this is unworthy for a *Scholar*, to *ſpeak*, or *hear*; for who ever was *ſo ſilly*, as to *ſay*, or *think*, that the precious *veſſels* of *Election* can *fall* away *finally*? this is not *anſwering* the *argument*, but *forſaking* the *Queſtion*. The *Queſtion* is, whether the *Grace* of God doth work *irreſiſtibly* in the *Elect*? not, whether or no it *brings them* to a moſt *certain* and *infallible* degree of *bliſſe*. (For they that *diſpute* againſt the *firſt*, *affirm* the *ſecond*,) *Grace* is proved to be *reſiſtible* in Gods *Elect*, by ſuch examples as *David*. And to that it is anſwer'd, he could not *ſo reſiſt*, as to fall away *finally*. Which is (firſt) a *skipping* from the *firſt* Queſtion, to the *ſecond*; and (*ſecondly*) 'tis to ſay, (what no man living did ever *gainſay*) That *ſuch as perſevere unto the end can never fall away finally*. A groſſe *identical propoſition*, which does not only *betray* the *weakneſſe* of that *opinion* which it *aſſerteth*, but does *eſtabliſh* the *Truth* of this very *cauſe* which I am *pleading*. For it confeſſeth, that *Grace* is *reſiſtible*; and only denies, that it is *finally reſiſted*. *David* was *able* to *reſiſt* it, but he *did* not *reſiſt* it *unto the end*. And every *technical Grammarian* can diſtinguiſh the *Act* which is imply'd in the *Participle*, from the *Aptitude* which is couched in the *Adjective* in *bi-*

lis.

lis. But (to haſten towards the end of my Readers *Task*,) there is alſo a *final*, as well as *total reſiſting* of ſuch a *Grace*, as is *ſufficient* for the attainment of *Glory*. For (not to ſpeak of thoſe men who *reſiſted* and *ſinn'd* againſt *all means* which could be us'd, *Iſa.* 5.4. and who *alwaies reſiſted the holy Ghoſt*, *Act.* 7. 51. and who *would not be gathered*; *after* never ſo *many eſſays*, *Mat.* 23.37.) how many *Chriſtian profeſſors* are now in *Hell*, who when they were *Infants*, were *fit* and *ſuitable* for *Heaven*? *Shall not I ſpare* Nineveh, *in which are above* 120000 *ſouls, which cannot diſtinguiſh betwixt the right hand and the left*? *Jon.* 4. 11. God ſpeaks there of *Heathen Infants*, towards whom ('tis ſaid) his *Bowels* did *yearn* within him, and that upon the *Impendence* of but a *temporal deſtruction*. But I ſpeak *here* of *Infants*, *both born*, and *baptiz'd*, into a *memberſhip* of the Church. How many are there of ſuch, as in their *harmleſſe Nonage* were *babes* of *Grace*, and yet have *out liv'd* their *Innocence*, ſo as at laſt to be transform'd into *veſſels* of *wrath*? I will ſhut up this *Paragraph* with the words of *Tertullian*. *Saul was turned into a Prophet by the Spirit of of holineſſe, as well as into an Apoſtate by the ſpirit of uncleanneſſe. And the Devil entred into* Judas, *who for ſome time together had been deputed with the elect.* And with the ſaying of *S. Auguſtine*, That *if the regenerate and juſtified ſhall fall away into a wicked courſe of living by his own will and pleaſure, he cannot ſay, I have not received, becauſe he hath wilfully loſt that Grace of God which he had received, by that will of his which was at liberty to ſin.* And how exactly that *Father doth ſpeak* my

Jonah. 4.11.

Saulem tam Dei Spiritus vertit in Prophetam, quam & malus ſpiritus poſtea in Apoſtatam. Judam aliquandiu cum electis deputatum poſtea Diabolus intravit. Tertul. de Animâ. c. 1.

Si regeneratus & juſtificatus in melam vitam ſuâ voluntate relabitur, certò is non poteſt dicere, Non accepi, quia acceptam gratiam Dei ſuo in malum arbitrio libero amiſit. Aug. de Grat. & Correp. c. 6. &. c. 9.

ſenſe

sense of this business, I leave it for any one to judge who shall consult * him. And I would very fain know, whether the *lost Groat*, the *lost Sheep*, and the *prodigal Son*, do not signifie (in our *Saviours Parables*) that a *true believer* may be *lost*, and being *lost* may be *found*, and again become a *true believer*. Which is as much as I desire, whereby to prove the thing under consideration.

* *De prad. Sanct. l.* 1. *c.* 14. *De bono Persev. l.* 2. *c.* 1. *&* 6. *&* *l.* 2. *c.* 8. *&* 13.

CHAP. V.

The Decree of Election conditional and respective.

54. HAving evinced to my self (and that is all that I pretend to) First, that my will *of it self* is *inclinable* to *evil*; and that, secondly, *of it self* is *not inclinable* to *good*; and that, thirdly, it is *inclined* by the *singular* and *special operation* of *Grace*, to the *refusing* of *evil*, and to the *choosing* of *good*, and that therefore in the *fourth place*, that *singular Grace* doth not *work* so *irresistibly* as to *compel* an *unwilling will*, but yet so *strongly* as to *heal* a *sick* one; not so *necessitating* the *will* of God's elect, as that *inevitably* it *must*, but yet so *powerfully perswading*, as that it *certainly will*, both *believe* and *obey*, and (after *repentance*) *persevere* unto the *end*; I should in *civility* to my *Reader*, conclude his *Trouble*; If I were sure that some men would not call it *Tergiversation*,; and if I were not *obliged* by *those papers*, which have been so *frequently*, so *falsly*, (that I may not say so maliciously) transcribed, and are *threatned* to be laid very *publiquely* to my *charge*, (as I plead often in the *defence* of this mine own *Publication*, which I should

Quâ gratiâ non nova voluntas creatur, neq; invita voluntas cogitur, sed infirma sanatur, depravata corrigitur, & ex malâ in bonam convertitur, ac interiore quodam modo trahitur, ut ex nolente volens efficiatur, & Divinæ vocationi libenter consentiat, &c. August. de grat. & lib. arb. ad Valent. c. 13.

I should never have *chosen* on *such* a *subject*, as I have *least* of all *studied*, and am the least *delighted* in,) to remonstrate the *utmost* of what I think in these matter. For I do *stedfastly beleeve* (what I also *asserted* in that *extemporary Discourse*, which was the *innocent cause* of this *unacceptable effect*,) That Gods *Decree* of *Election* from all *eternity*, was not *absolute*, and *irrespective*, but in *respect unto*, and in *præscience* of some qualification, without which *no man is the proper object* of *such Decree*. And this I prove to my self from these waies of Reasoning.

Sicut præscit, prædestinat, & propterea prædestinat, quia quale futurum sit, præscit. Mala tantùm præscit, & non prædestinat. Aug. in Resp. ad calum. Pelag. sub initium l. 6. Hypognosticon.

Proved by reason, from its being respective of our being in Christ, and of the conditions by which we are so.

55. *First*, I consider with my self, that there is *no salvation* but only to *such*, as are found to be in *Christ Jesus*, in the day of *Death* and of *Judgement*. Which no man living can be, unlesse he be qualified with such *conditions*, as *without which* it is *impossible* to be *so found*; (such as are *Faith*, and *Obedience*, and *Repentance*, after sin, *bringing forth such fruits as are worthy of Repentance*, and *perseverance* in *weldoing unto the end*.) That God will *save* none but *such*, is *all intelligent men's Confession*. And that he *saves* none but *Them* whom he *decrees* to save, is every whit as *plain*. Therefore none but *such* are the *object* of *such Decree*. For if he *decreed* to save any without *regard* or *respect* to their being such, he might *actually save* them without *regard* or *respect* to their being *such*. Because whatsoever is *justly decreed*, may justly be *executed*, as it is decreed. But it is granted on all sides, (as I suppose,) that God will save *none*, except *such* as are found to be in *Christ* with the aforesaid *qualifications*; and therefore it should be *agreed* on all sides, that he *decreed* to save *none* but *such as They*. And what is that but a *respective*, and *conditional* Decree? made in *intuition* of our *being* in *Christ*, and of our being

so qualified to be *in Christ*? So that although *our election is not of works*, but *of him that calleth*, yet *good works* are required as a *necessary condition*, though utterly unworthy to be a *cause* of *our election*. Nor can it be without respect to the *condition* of the *Covenant*, that the *Covenant* is *made*, and the *promise decreed* to be *fulfilled*.

56. *Secondly*, I consider, that the *Decree* of the *Father* to *send* the *Son* to be a *second Adam*, was in *respect* and *regard* to the *backesliding* of the *first Adam*. Without which it was *impossible*, that the Son of God should have been sent to be the *Saviour* of the world. And the *decree* of God Almighty to save the *first Adam*, was in regard of and *respect* to the *meritoriousnesse* of the *second Adam*. For God *adopteth* never a *child*, nor doth *acknowledge* him for *his own*, so as to give him *eternal life*, unlesse it be for the sake of his *only begotten Son*. First God *pitied* a *woful world*, then he *lov'd* what he *pitied*, next he *gave* his own *Son* to *save* what he *lov'd*, and upon the *condition* of *beleeving in his Son*, he gave it a promise of *eternal life*. For so *beleeving* is *interpos'd* betwixt *love* and *life*, in the 3. of *S. John* vers. 26. *God so lov'd the world*, that he gave his only *begotten Son*, that whosoever *beleeveth in him*, should not perish, but have *everlasting life*. From this Text it appeareth, that God *loved* the *world*, *before* he *gave* his *Son* to it; for *therefore gave* he his *Son*, because he *lov'd* it. But it was not a *love* by which he lov'd it to *life everlasting*; for with *such love* he only loved it in his *Son*. And the world is not capable of such a *love*, without the *condition* of *Beleeving*. It was therefore in præscience of our *Beleeving in Christ*, that God *elected* us to *life eternal*. For Christ is not *only* the *means*, (as some affirm) but the *meritorious cause*, and the *Head* of our

Eph. 1. 4. 6.
Rom. 8. 39.
2 Cor. 5. 15.

our *Election*. *Christ was foreknown*, 1 *Pet.* 1. 2. and *we in him*, *Rom.* 8. 29. Christ was *prædestin'd*, and *we by him*, *Eph.* 1. 5.

57. *Thirdly*, I consider, that there must be a *Difference*, before there can be an *Election*. *Love* indeed is an *act* of *favour*, but *Election* is properly an *act* of *Judgement*; a *preferring* of the *better*, before the *worse*. They that say God *Elected* such a number of men, without the least *intuition* of their qualifications, by which they are differenced from the *reprobated crew*, do speak *illogically* (to say no worse,) how much *safer* is it to say, That because such men as are *in Christ by Faith*, are *better* then such as are *out of Christ* by *Infidelity*, therefore *Those* are *taken*, and *These* are *left*? Nor doth this *derogate* from *God*, or *arrogate* to *man*, to say he *chooseth* his own *gifts*; any more then it doth, to say *he crown's them*. For God doth *give* us the *advantage* of our being *in Christ*, as well as *choose* us for that *advantage*. For first he *giveth* us his *Son*, next he giveth us his *Grace* whereby to *enable* us to *believe* in his *Son*, and *so beleeving* he doth *elect* us. So that here is no *matter* for man to *boast of*; he having *nothing* which he hath not *received*, no not so much as his αὐτεξούσιον. It is *God* that *makes* the *difference*, as well as *God* that *chooseth*. And it seems this very argument from the *Nature* and *Use* of the word *Election*, did prevail with *S. Austin* and *Oecumenius*. *S. Austin* saith expresly, that *Justification precedeth Election*; and his reason is, because no man is *elected*, *unlesse he differ from him that is rejected*.

And from the nature of Election.

Εἰπὼν κατ' ἐκλογὴν, ἔδειξεν ὅτι καὶ διέφερον ἀλλήλων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐκλέγεται ἕτερον ἀπ' ἑτέρου, εἰ μή τι αὐτοῦ διαλλάσσοι. *Oecum. apud Episc. Wint. de Artic. Lam. Jud.*

Non tamen Electio præcedit Justificationem, sed Electionem Justificatio. Nemo enim eligitur, nisi jam distans ab illo qui rejicitur. Unde quod dictum est, Quia elegit nos Deus ante mundi constitutionem, non video quomodo sit dicendum nisi præscientiâ. August. ad Simpl. 1. 2.

58. *Fourthly*,

Proved by Scripture.

58. *Fourthly*, I consider, that the whole *Tenor* of the *Scriptures*, in the *Judgement* of *all* the *Fathers*, who are best able to *understand them*, teacheth no other *Prædestination*, then *in*, and *through Christ*, which is *respective* and *conditional*. First the Scripture gives us none but *conditional promises*, such as, *If any man keep my saying, he shall never taste Death. Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he reap.* And *we shall reap, if we faint not. If any man will hear my voice, and open the dore, I will come in to him*, &c. Nay even the very Texts which are wont to be urged for *irrespective Election*, do seem very precisely to *evince* the *contrary*. For when God is said to *prædestine* according to *his own good pleasure which he had purposed in himself*, the word εὐδοκία rendred *good pleasure*, doth not signifie the *absoluteness*, but the *respectiveness* of his *will*. For it *relateth* unto something in which God is *well pleased*, and that is *Christ*. It being impossible for God to *please himself* with *mankind*, or for *men* to be *acceptable* and *well-pleasing* to God, any otherwise then in *him*, of whom it was said, *This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased.* Besides; *all* those *Scriptures* which doe teach *universal Grace*, and *Redemption*, (which I suppose hath been *proved* in the prosecution of my *first Principle*,) do seem to me most clearly to inferre a *respective* and *conditional Election*. For if it is true, that Christ did offer up himself, not only *sufficiently*, but *intentionally* for all; if he did *earnestly desire* that *every one* would *come in*, upon the preaching of his *Word*, and receive the benefit of his *Death* and *Passion*; if his *warnings* were not in *jest*, and his *Invitations serious*; if [*depart from me ye cursed*] was therefore *foretold*, that every one might *beware*, and not *obtrude* himself

Joh. 8. 51. Gal. 6. 7. 9. Rev. 3. 20.

Eph. 9.

himself upon that *sentence*; if he is *unwilling* that any one should be *caught* in the *Serpents snare*, who shewes to *all* (without exception) a *certain way* to *escape*, if (as S. *Austin speaks*) *he* is desirous *not* to *strike*, who bids us *look* to our *posture*, and *stand* upon our *Guard*; if (as S. *Austin* speaks *again*) he shews his *power* to to *punish none*, but only those that *refuse* his *Mercy*; and would not *damn* any one without *respect* unto *sin*, who gave his *own Son* to die for *All*; then his refusing of the *Goats*, in *respect* of that which makes them *differ* from *Sheep*, infers his *Election* of the *sheep*, in *respect* of that which makes them differ from *Goats*. And I have made the more haste to make *this Inference*, because as the *respectivenesse* of *Election* needs not otherwise to be prov'd, than by the *respectivenesse* of *Reprobation*; so they are both taken for *granted*, upon the supposition of *Christ*'s having dyed not only *sufficiently*, but *intentionally* for *All*. Towards which (having discourfed so largely of it already I will only offer this *one consideration*, which *meets* my *pen* as I am *writing*, and even *obtrudes* it self upon me to be *deliver'd*. 'Tis briefly this. That since our *Saviour* upon the *Crosse*, did very *heartily pray*, even for those very *homicides*, and *parricides*, and *Deicides* that *Kill'd* him, we have no reason but to believe, That he *laid down* his *life* even for *them* that *took it away*; and that he *dyed* for *all* for whom he *prayed*. And yet we reading of their *Murders*, but not of their *Repentance*, I should be loth to tell *my people*, that those *crucifying wretches*, were *pretious vessels* of *Election*, (in complyance with that opinion, that *Christ died only for the Elect*,) lest they should *comfort* up themselves in the most *crimson sins* that.

Aug. in Serm. 28. de Sanct. Idem contra 2 epist. Pelag. l. 3. c. 2. Idem de sp. & lit. ad Marcell. c. 33.

that can be nam'd, (like some in the world,) as *well consisting* with their *pretensions* to the *Kingdom* of *Heaven*. And yet in my *shallow Judgement*, (which because it is *shallow*, I do submit to those of *deeper* & *profounder reach*, how *dogmatically* soever I may seem to have spoken in many places of this Discourse,) I say in my shallow Judgement, Christ dyed for *All*, for whom he *pray'd*; and he *prayed* for them that *curst themselves*. *His bloud be upon us* (said they,) and yet (said he,) *Father forgive them*. He made his *Murderers Execration* become his *prayer*. He took the *poyson* out of their *Curse*, & made it *wholesome* for them. He *wished*, as well as they, *that his bloud might be, both upon them, and upon their children*; but in his own most *merciful*, not in their barbarous and *cruel sense*; for *they* meant the *guilt*, *He* the *benefit* of his *bloud*; and would have it *light on them*, not to *accuse*, but *cleanse* them. And yet I dare not affirm, that they were all a *portion* of *God's Elect*.

59. Lastly, I consider, that the main *stream* of the *Fathers* doth *run* this *way*. And not to trouble my *Reader* with such a *Catalogue* of particulars, as I gave in before, for a *Conditional Reprobation*, (which yet I think were very easie upon a very *smal warning*,) I will content my self at present to prove what I say from the confessions of *Beza*, & Doctor *Twisse*. First *Beza* in his *Comment* upon *Rom.* 11. 2. rejects the Judgement of the *Fathers*, because they are not (as he would have them) for the *absolute*, *irrespective*, *unconditonal* way. And Dr. *Twisse* confesseth, that *all the Ancients*, before S. *Austin*, did place the *object* of *God's Election* in *Fide praevisâ*. At which S. *Austin* was so far from being any way displeas'd, as that (with very great *reverence* to their *Authority*) he made it appear to be an *innocent* and *harmlesse Tenent*. He affirm'd that all the *Fathers*, who liv'd before

And by Antiquity, from the concessions of Anti-remonstrants.

Patres hîc nullo modo audiendi, qui ad praevisionem hoc referunt. Beza *in* Rom. 11. 2. edit. 2. *Twiss. in Vin. Gr. l. 1. part. 1. Digr. 8. sect. 4. p. 110.* *August. de bono persever. c. 19. & 20.* *Twiss. loco citato.*

before himself, agreed in this, *That the Grace of God is not prevented by humane merits.* Which *one profession* he thought *sufficient, for the asserting of the free Grace of the Divine prædestination.* To which saying of *S. Austin* because I find that Dr. *Twisse* doth very *readily subscribe*; I ought in reason to be secured from any very *hard censure*, because I am not an *affirmer* of *humane merits*, much lesse do I *place* them in a *precedency* to *Grace.*

60. I conclude with a desire of so much *liberty* of *conscience*, as to believe with *S. Paul*, That *God is a respecter, not of* * *Persons*, but of * *Works.* That my *sins* are *perfectly* and *entirely mine own.* And that if I do any thing that is *good*, it is *not I that do it*, but the *Grace* of *God* in me. Yet so, as that *I can* do *all things*, through him that *strengthens me.* And who indeed doth *so strengthen*, as that I *may* do them, but not so *force* me, as that I *must.* In this, and every other thing, I have been long since taught by *Vincentius Lirinensis*, (whom I shall ever observe to the *utmost* of my *Discretion*) To *opine* with the *most*, and *most Judicious*, rather then with the *fewest*, and least *discerning.* *Opinionastrete* is a *fault*; but *Fallibility* is *none.* If my *Teachers* are in the *right*, they have *knowledge* enough, to make me *moderately instructed*; if they are any where in the *wrong*, they have *authority* enough, to make me *pardonably erroneous*; if I have not *perspicacity* to *comprehend* them as they deserve, it seems they have *Depths* enough to prove, I am *Invincibly ignorant.*

The Conclusion.

* Rom. 2. 11.
* Vers. 14.

1 Cor. 15. 10.

Phil. 4, 13.

FINIS.